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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to this Court.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (Supp. 2016).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue 1

Background

In 2001, John Zane Jeppesen ("Zane") borrowed $500,000 from Harry
McMurdie's IRA. Zane signed two promissory notes and, to secure the debt, two
trust deeds against property Zane owned. In 2003 and 2004, Zane executed new
promissory notes regarding the same debt but did not execute a new trust deed.
On March 24, 2005, Zane defaulted on his debt obligation, triggering for
Mr. McMurdie a statute of limitation deadline of March 24, 2011. With that
deadline in mind, Zane and Mr. McMurdie entered another agreement regarding
the debt on March 22, 2011, and a similar agreement on March 22, 2013. Zane did
@

not execute a new trust deed in connection with the 2011 and 2013 agreements.
Zane then defaulted under the 2013 agreement, and Mr. McMurdie

@

commenced a non-judicial foreclosure on the property Zane had put up as
collateral in 2001. Zane's son, Luke, to whom Zane had quitclaimed the property,
filed this action, in which he argued that the limitation period for foreclosure had
run. The next day, Mr. McMurdie's IRA purchased the property in foreclosure.

1
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If the 2003, 2004, 2011, and 2013 documents renezved and extended the 2001
note, the non-judicial foreclosure was timely since it occurred within six years of
Zane's default under the 2013 extension and the debt was secured by the 2001
trust deed.
On the other hand, if the 2003, 2004, 2011, or 2013 documents superseded
and extinguished the 2001 note, the non-judicial foreclosure was not proper since
~

the 2001 note was no longer of any effect and (because Zane executed no trust
deed after 2001) Zane's debt under the subsequent agreements was unsecured.
(iJ

Whether a new promissory note renews and extends an old one or
supersedes and extinguishes it is governed by "the general rule that the intent of
the parties should control the 'renewal' effect of subsequent promissory notes."

Peterson v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 250,255 (D. Utah 1981). In other words,
"one contract will not supersede another 'unless it is plainly shown that [such]
was the intent of the parties[.]"' Ward v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 362,

,r 8, 173 P.3d 186 (citation omitted).
Issue 1
Did the trial court err by holding as a matter of law that the 2001 note was
superseded where that holding required a determination of Zane's and Mr.
McMurdie's intent and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Zane and Mr.
McMurdie intended to renew or supersede the 2001 agreement?

2
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Issue 2

Background
In the trial court, Mr. McMurdie argued that even if the 2003, 2004, 2011,
and 2013 documents did not renew the 2001 note, Luke was estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations against a foreclosure of the 2001 trust deed
<@

because Zane fraudulently induced Mr. McMurdie to reasonably forego
initiating a foreclosure within the limitation period.
Issue 2
Did the trial court err by failing to hold that factual issues exist as to
whether Luke is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations against a
foreclosure under the 2001 trust deed where Luke is in privity with Zane and
there is conflicting evidence as to whether Zane fraudulently induced Mr.
McMurdie to reasonably delay the foreclosure?
Standard of Review

Both issues arise from the trial court's grant of sum1nary judgment in favor
of Luke D. Jeppesen. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, this Court "'accord[s] no deference to the trial court, but review[s] its
conclusions for correctness."' McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392,394 (Utah Ct. App.

3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1997) (citation omitted)." As the nonmoving party, [Mr. McMurdie] 'is entitled to
the benefit of having the [C]ourt consider all of the facts presented, and every
inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most favorable to hiln."' Uintah

Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ,r 19, 179 P.3d 786.
Preservation

Issue 1 was preserved by the parties' briefing on Luke D. Jeppesen's
Motion for Summary Judginent on Quiet Title Claims (R. 1450-51, 1453-59, 194750); the parties' briefing on the Motion to Revise or Vac~te Ruling Granting
Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claim (R. 2746-55, 2979-80, 2999-3004); and
the trial court's rulings on those motions (R. 2732, 2734-35, 3037-40).
Issue 2 was preserved in the Reply in Support of Bank of Utah's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Luke D. Jeppesen and Summary Judginent in Favor
of Bank of Utah (R. 1690-95); Bank of Utah's Memorandum in Opposition to
Luke D. Jeppesen's Motion for Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claims (R.
1952-56); and Bank of Utah's Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on Application of
the Equitable Discovery Rule (R. 2595-2606). If this issue was not preserved, the
Court should address it under the plain error exception to the preservation rule. 1

The question of whether Issue 2 was adequately preserved or should be
addressed under the plain error exception is more fully briefed in the Argument
section below.
1

4
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The issues in this appeal are governed by common law. The interpretation
of statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions is not required.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

This case involves Zane Jeppesen's years' long perpetuation of a nowadmitted securities fraud scheme against scores of his friends and neighbors. 2
One of Zane's victims was a long-time friend named Harry McMurdie, who
initially gave $500,000 from his IRA retire1nent account to Zane as an investment
in an entity called Beverly Hills Development Corporation. 3 Zane secured Mr.

McMurdie's investment with a trust deed to property that Zane owned. 4
Each time the deadline came for Zane to repay Mr. McMurdie's $500,000
principal investment, Zane would convince Mr. McMurdie to extend the
maturity date of the loan. 5 Zane or his attorney would then prepare documents
to me1norialize the extension. 6 Yet, at relevant times, Zane did not disclose that

2

R. 1125-38, 1604-61; see also Burdick v. Horner Townsend & Kent, Inc., 2015 UT 8,

ilil 1-6, 345 P.3d 531 (labeling Beverly Hills Development Corporation's
promissory note scheme an "inveshnent scam").
3

R. 1195-96, 1270-71, 1838, 1841.

4

R. 1089-96, 1272.

5

R. 1060, 1062-63, 1065-66, 1274-75, 1334-38, 1340-41, 1769-72, 1779, 1851-53.

6

Id.
5Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he had been investigated in Idaho and admitted to selling unregistered securities
there without a license; that the promissory note securities he was then selling in
Utah were unregistered; and that he was not licensed in Utah to sell securities. 7
Zane also did not disclose to Mr. McMurdie that, although he had promised Mr.

Gt.i

McMurdie a first-position trust deed on Zane's property, there was at least one
other trust deed that had priority over Mr. McMurdie's. 8 Nor did Zane tell Mr.
McMurdie when he was charged with securities fraud in Utah or when he
quitclaimed the collateral to his son Luke. 9 Finally, each time the loan's maturity
date was pushed back, Zane led Mr. McMurdie to believe that the loan was being
renewed and remained secured through the trust deed to Zane's property. 10
About a dozen years after making his initial investment, but only months
after the last extension of the maturity date, Mr. McMurdie realized he had been
duped all along, and he had the trustee initiate a non-judicial foreclosure on the
trust deed Zane had given at the outset to secure Mr. McMurdie' s investment. 11
Mr. McMurdie's IRA then purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. 12

7

R. 1741-42.

8

R. 1272-74.

9

R. 1849-50, 1868.

10

R. 1274-75, 1334-41.

n R. 1849-50, 1347-50.
12

Gv

R. 1377-84.
6
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The day before the trustee's sale, Zane's son, Luke, to whom Zane had
quitclahned the property five years earlier, filed this quiet title action, clahning
that the foreclosure was improper. 13 Luke also alleged a claim of failure to release
a security interest. 14
Bank of Utah, as custodian of Mr. McMurdie's IRA; Mr. McMurdie; and
~

Mr. McMurdie's wife (the "McMurdie Parties") brought a quiet title
counterclaim, as well as counter- and third-party claims again.st, respectively,
Luke and Zane for pattern of unlawful activity and civil conspiracy. 15
Following discovery, Luke and the McMurdie Parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment on the quiet title claims. 16 The trial court ruled in favor of
Luke on those 1notions, and the McMurdie Parties filed a Motion to Revise or
Vacate Ruling Granting Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claim, which the trial
court denied. 17 The parties' remaining claims were also disposed of by motion. 18
The McMurdie Parties now appeal from the trial court's grant and reaffirmation
of summary judgment in favor of Luke on his quiet title claim. 19

13

R. 1-35.

14

R. 42-43, 78-79.

15

R. 186-255, 1604-61.

16

R. 1028-49, 1389-1425, 1442-66, 1680-97, 1944-66, 1967-91.

17

R. 2722-44, 2745-58, 2976-82, 2996-3006, 3036-42.

18

R. 2718-44, 3050-52.

l9

R. 3067-69.

7
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~

Statement of Facts 20

Zane's New Job
After graduating from high school, Zane Jeppesen was hired at La-Z-Boy
by Mr. McMurdie, the co1npany's personnel manager. 21 Zane worked at La-ZBoy for about six years and then at Thiokol for about 10. 22 In 1995, Zane quit his
job at Thiokol and went to work for Mike Fitzgerald. 23
Mike was Zane's brother-in-law and a co-owner of Beverly Hills
Development Corporation ("Beverly Hills"). 24 Beverly Hills purported to be
developing land "out in Beverly Hills, California, or Bel Air, you know, just in
the California area." 25 The corporation claimed to have about six home lots that it
was developing and some "other lands that were ... still sitting at the time." 26

~

Zane did not know whether the company was using investor money to "move

VVhen reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court "'"evaluate[s] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that evidence in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.""' Peak Alarm Co. v.
Salt Lake CihJ Corp., 2010 UT 22, ,r 16, 243 P.3d 1221 (citations omitted). This
Statement of Facts and the preceding Nature of the Case and Course of
Proceedings recite the facts accordingly.
20

21

R. 1168, 1270.

22

R. 1168.

23

R. 1165-66, 1174.

24

R. 1165, 1173-74.

25

R. 1165.

26

R. 1165-66.

~

8
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the dirt" or to "[f]iJ.1.d more land," but he testified that, one way or another,
"[Mike Fitzgerald] 1nade a miJ.1.t of very nice lots." 27
RaisiJ.1.g Funds
Zane's job for Beverly Hills was to raise funds, which he did by selling
promissory notes to his friends, and then to his friends' friends. 28 He would tell
@

them that an inveshnent in Beverly Hills would yield a 12 % return, with interest
usually paid monthly, and that their investment would be secured by a lien. 29
Zane sometimes promised investors a lien against Beverly Hills land. 30
Other times, he would give a trust deed against his own land. 31 When he put his
II

own land up as collateral, it was so that the investor could see how [the
investment would] go[] for a couple of months." 32 Then, if [e]verything look[ed]
11

II

good," they would transfer over and take collateral from [Beverly Hills] and
release [Zane's] land." 33 Unbeknownst to investors, the trust deeds that Zane
promised against Beverly Hills land were never recorded. 34

@

27

R. 1166, 1177.

28

R. 1165-67, 1175.

29

R. 1167, 1175, 1178, 1195.

30

R. 1167.

31

R. 1171-72, 1731.

32

R. 1171, 1731.

33

R. 1172.

34

R. 1167-68.

9
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Overhead Payments and Zane's Incmne
When investors "would come in with funds," Zane would "keep enough
back" to "make the [interest] payments" promised to other investors, which
pay1nents Zane and Mike referred to as overhead." 35 Also, rather than give
II

~

Zane a paycheck, Mike would sometimes instruct Zane to keep a -portion of an
investor's funds for himself as "income." 36 Zane would then wire the rest of the
person's inveshnent to Beverly Hills or to wherever Mike directed. 37
Securities Violations in Idaho
For a time, Zane sold Beverly Hills promissory notes in Idaho. 38 In fact, by
December 1999, he "ha[d] solicited investments~ Idaho in the a1nount of
$294,000." 39 However, the state of Idaho investigated and found that Zane was

~

illegally selling umegistered securities and that he did not have an Idaho license
to sell securities in any event. 40 Zane admitted these findings; agreed to pay off
II

the outstanding principal and interest bal~nces to [his] Idaho investors"; and quit
selling promissory notes in Idaho. 41
35

R. 1178.

36

R. 1166-67.

37

R. 1166, 1178.

38

R. 1724-25.

39

R. 1726-27.

40

R. 1724-29, 1076-80.

41

Id.
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Diana Doutre Invests $50,000 in. Beverly Hills
But the Idaho investigation did not stop Zane from selling Beverly Hills
promissory notes in Utah. 42 On September 4, 2001, he sold a $50,000 promissory
note to Diana Doutre in Utah. 43 He prmnised her a 12% return and gave her a
trust deed against land he had purchased in 1998 in Alpine, Utah
~

(the" Alpine Property"). 44 He did not tell her that he had been investigated and
sanctioned in Idaho for making similar deals there or that the Idaho investigation
had concluded with hiln admitting to the illegal sale of unregistered securities. 45
Harry McMurdie Invests $500,000 in Beverly Hills
Zane also approached Mr. McMurdie about investing in Beverly Hills. 46
Mr. McMurdie had known Zane for "at least 35-40 years" and, as noted, had
hired him at La-Z-Boy years earlier. 47 Mr. McMurdie saw Zane as a "friend." 48 He
also knew that Zane's "family was a prominent, well-respected family in the
Tremonton ... area" where Mr. McMurdie lived. 49

@

42

R. 1125-38.

43

R. 1729-32, 1082.

44

R. 1083-86, 1503, 1514-15, 1711, 1729-32.

45

R. 1731.

46

R. 1270, 1838.

47

Id.

48

R. 1841.

49

R. 1270.
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In talking to Mr. McMurdie about investing in Beverly Hills, "[Zane]
started waving [around] interest rates that were hard [for Mr. McMurdie] to pass
[up]' and "then went back to the trust thing/' reminding Mr. McMurdie that he
1

had "known Zane all ... his life and had "[k]nown [Zane's] family." 50 Zane also
11

offered to secure Mr. McMurdie's investment with a first-position trust deed
against Zane's Alpine Property. 51 Ultilnately, Zane convinced Mr. McMurdie to
invest $500,000 from his IRA retirement account in Beverly Hills, and Mr.
McMurdie chose Bank of Utah to be the trustee for his Beverly Hills inveshnent. 52
Although Zane was willing to secure Mr. McMurdie's investment with a
trust deed to Zane's Alpine Property, Zane did not disclose that he had paid only
$240,000 for that 4.82 acre parcel only three and a half years earlier. 53 Instead, he
told Mr. McMurdie that the Alpine Property "was worth up to $500,000 per
acre." 54 Zane also did not disclose that two other trust deeds already encumbered
the property: one in favor of Gerald M. Conder, an owner of the entity that sold
the property to Zane and provided seller financing; and one in favor of the Diana

50

R. 1838.

51

R. 1205-06, 1271, 1847.

52

R. 1195-96, 1270-71, 1838.

53

R. 1272, 1711, 1720

54

R. 1272, 1869.
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~

M. Doutre IRA to secure Ms. Doutre's $50,000 investment. 55 Finally, Zane did not
tell Mr. McMurdie that he had already admitted to illegally selling um·egistered
securities in Idaho; that he did not have a license to sell securities in Utah; and
~

that he had not registered the promissory note securities he was then selling. 56
The 2001 McMurdie Documents
Zane himself prepared four documents in connection with Mr.
McMurdie' s 2001 investment in Beverly Hills:
(1)

A promissory note dated September 24, 2001, from Zane personally
to Bank of Utah, Custodian for Harry McMurdie IRA; 57

(2)

A promissory note dated September 24, 2001, fr01n Beverly Hills to
Bank of Utah, Custodian for Harry McMurdie IRA; 58

(3)

A trust deed recorded on September 26, 2001, conveying the Alpine
Property in trust to secure Mr. McMurdie's investment; 59 and

(4)

A trust deed recorded on October 4, 2001, conveying the Alpine
Property in trust to secure Mr. McMurdie's investment. 60

The promissory notes (collectively, the "2001 Note") each identified an
indebtedness of $500,000; an interest rate of 12%; and March 24, 2003, as the date

55

R. 1272-73, 1723, 1729-30, 1732-33.

56

R. 1177, 1741-42, 1272-73.

57

R. 1056.

R. 1058. The copy of this note that appears in the Record contains no signature.
(Id.) Viewed in a light 1nost favorable to Mr. McMurdie, however, Zane's
testimony confirms that Zane signed the original. (See R. 1743.)

58

59

R. 1089-92.

60

R. 1093-96.
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by which the principal and interest were to be paid in full. 61 The 2001 note from
Zane also stated, as follows, that it could be renewed and extended: "The
makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof ... consent to any and all
extensions of time, renewals, ... or modifications that may be granted by the
holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note[.]" 62
Mr. McMurdie was "not aware in 2001 that two different trust deeds
[(collectively, the "2001 Trust Deed")] had been recorded." 63 He simply and
genuinely "trusted Zane ... to appropriately handle everything involved with
[his] IRA's purchase of [the] $500,000 promissory note inveshnent." 64
The 2003 Renewal of Mr. McMurdie's Secured Debt
From October 2001 through March 2003, Zane made an interest payment
each month to Mr. McMurdie's IRA. 65 Then, before the entire principal and
interest on Mr. McMurdie's investment came due on March 24, 2003, Mr.

~

McMurdie agreed to extend his investment for one year at an interest rate of
16%. 66 Mr. McMurdie did not ask for a new promissory note or other
documentation of the extension, but Zane prepared a new $500,000 promissory
61

R. 1056, 1058, 1271.

62

R. 1056.

63

R. 1272.

64

Id.

6s

Id.

66

Id.

Gv
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note (the "2003 Note") anyway. 67 Zane signed the 2003 Note on behalf of Beverly
Hills and made it payable to "Harry Land/ or Shira H McMurdie (primary)
Hany and Shira McMurdie Family Trust (secondary)." 68 The 2003 Note listed an
interest rate of ".0800%"; called for monthly interest payments; and stated that
the full principal and interest would be due a year later, on March 24, 2004. 69
@

Zane did not create a new trust deed in connection with the 2003 Note, but on
the 2003 Note he listed his Alpine Property as the "PROPERTY ADDRESS." 70
Mr. McMurdie does not recall whether he noticed that Zane made the 2003
Note to Mr. McMurdie and his wife individually, instead of to Mr. McMurdie' s
IRA, or whether he noticed that the 2003 Note mistakenly listed an interest rate
of "0.0800%." 71 But even if he had noticed those things, they "would not have
mattered" because Mr. McMurdie still "completely trusted Zane ... to
appropriately document [Mr. McMurdie's] IRA's investment and pay
appropriate interest on that investment." 72

@

67

R. 1060, 1272.

6s

Id.

69

R. 1060.

70

Id.

71

R. 1274.

72

Id.

@

<@
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At the time of the 2003 Note, Zane again did not tell Mr. McMurdie that he
had paid only $240,000 for the Alpme Property; that two other trust deeds
encumbered the property and had priority over Mr. McMurdie's 2001 Trust
Deed; that he had illegally sold umegistered securities in Idaho; that he did not
have a license to sell securities in Utah; or that he had not registered in Utah the
promissory note securities he was then selling. 73
~

New Investors and Diana Doutre's Contract Extension
On December 3, 2003, Zane executed another trust deed against the Alpine
Property, this time to secure a $200,000 investment in Beverly Hills by LW Miller
Transportation Holdings, Inc. 74 Then on December 23, 2003, Zane gave yet
another trust deed against the Alpme Property, this one to secure a $135,000
investment in Beverly Hills by the Daniel J. Franks Revocable Trust. 75
Finally, on January 29, 2004, after the maturity date of Ms. Doutre's
investment had passed, Zane convinced Ms. Doutre to enter an extension
agreement that moved the maturity date of her investment to September 4, 2004,
and kept her trust deed to the Alpine Property in first position. 76

73

R. 1177, 1272-73, 1711, 1720, 1723, 1729-30, 1732-33, 1741-42.

74

R. 1103-06, 1183-84, 1200, 1206.

75

R. 1115-18, 1716-17, 1740, 1747-48.

76

R. 1082-86, 1748.
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The 2004 Renewal of Mr. McMurdie's Secured Debt
From April 2003 through March 2004, Zane again 1nade 1nonthly interest
payments to Mr. McMurdie's IRA. 77 The last payment was on March 18, 2004. 78
That sa1ne month, Mr. McMurdie "was prepared to cash out [his] IRA's $500,000
inveshnent and collect all the interest that was then due." 79 But he learned that

<a

Zane "was going through a rough time" because "problems had occurred with
[Beverly Hills]," and Zane proposed that Mr. McMurdie "extend the debt on the
original $500,000 promissory note investment for [one more] year." 80
Mr. McMurdie accepted Zane's proposal, and Zane "personally issue[d]
two new promissory notes: one note in the amount of the $500,000 principal debt
with interest at 8% and a second note in the amount of $200,271.11, representing
interest then due on the original debt as calculated by Zane." 81 The second note
stated an interest rate of 16 %.82 These two notes (the "2004 Notes") were each
made payable to "Harry I. and/ or Shira H McMurdie (primary) Harry and Shira
McMurdie Family Trust (secondary)." 83

@)

@

77

R. 1274.

78

R. 1275, 1750.

79

R. 1275.

80

R. 1275, 1470-72 (emphasis added).

81

R. 1062-63, 1065-66, 1275.

82

R. 1065-66, 1275.

83

R. 1062-63, 1065-66.
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~

The 2004 Notes also each contained the following provision:
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this
Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust or Security Deed (the "Security
Instrument"), dated the same date as this Note, protects the Note
Holder from possible losses which might result if I do not keep the
promises which I make in this Note. 84
Despite that language, Zane issued no new trust deed to Mr. McMurdie, but on
the 2004 Notes themselves he listed his Alpine Property as the "PROPERTY
ADDRESS." 85 And Mr. McMurdie "believed at that time that [his] invesbnents
with Zane ... were [still] fully secured by the Alpine Property." 86
Regarding the 2004 Notes, Mr. McMurdie testified as follows:

Q.

. .. Zane signed two notes [on March 24, 2004,] saying that he
owed you over $700,000, right?

84

A.

Yes.

Q.

So what was loaned? I mean, where did that money go?

A.

Where did what money go?

Q.

Well, this says you're lending him 200,000 and this says you're
lending him 500,000.

A.

He already has it.

Q.

He already has it? Okay.

A.

Sure. He didn't pay me anything back.

Q.

Right.

R. 1063, 1066.

~R.1063,1066,1554.
86

R. 1275.
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A.

Maybe that's a good question to bring up, where is that money?

Q.

But basically these were to replace the 2001 note?

A.

Yes. 87

Zane also testified about the 2004 Notes:
Q.

Okay. And similar to the contract extension that you did with
Diana Doutre, you were rolling over Harry McMurdie's debt
into new promissory notes on March 24, 2004, weren't you?

A.

Extending?

Q.

Extending, rolling over, whatever you want to call it.

A.

Yes. 88

~

~

Mr. McMurdie Invests an Additional $60,000 in Beverly Hills
A few days after Zane prepared the 2004 Notes, Mr. McMurdie invested an
additional $60,000 in Beverly Hills. 89 What" prompted that investment was ...
[Mr. McMurdie' s desire to] try to help out." 90 Again, Mr. McMurdie understood
that Zane and Beverly Hills were "going through a rough time," and he was
"hopeful that [his] $60,000 investment would help [them] resolve their financial
issues." 91

87

R. 1476-77.

ss R. 1754-55 (emphasis added).
89

R. 1275.

90

R. 1470.

91

R. 1275, 1470-72.
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Rather than have Zane draft a new promissory note for the $60,000
inveshnent, Zane and Mr. McMurdie "wrote '$60K fr01n Tx inheritance' on the
second [2004 Note], which meant that this was a $60,000 investment derived
from [Mr. McMurdie's] inheritance from [his] biological father in Texas." 92
In connection with the 2004 Notes, Zane again did not disclose that he had
paid only $240,000 for the Alpine Property; that two trust deeds encu1nbered the
property and two of them had priority over Mr. McMurdie' s 2001 Trust Deed;
that he had illegally sold umegistered securities in Idaho; that he did not have a
license to sell securities in Utah; and that he had not registered in Utah the
promissory note securities he was selling. 93 Nor did he tell Mr. McMurdie that
during the previous few months he had given two additional trust deeds against
the Alpine Property and signed a contract extension with Ms. Doutre. 94
After Zane signed the 2004 Notes and Mr. McMurdie made his additional,
$60,000 inveshnent, neither Zane nor Beverly Hills made any further payments

to Mr. McMurdie or his IRA. 95

92

R. 1065-66, 1275.

93

R. 1177, 1272-74, 1711, 1720, 1723, 1729-30, 1732-33, 1741-42.

94

R. 1087, 1272-74.

95

R. 1750.
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'&I

Things Go Bad with Beverly Hills
In April 2004, "things went bad" with Beverly Hills. 96 Zane's brother's

brother-in-law, Randy Zundel, had previously 1nade a $100,000 investment in
Beverly Hills, and Randy's best friend, Bruce Sorensen, had made a $220,000
inveshnent in Beverly Hills. 97 When they learned that things had gone bad,
@

Randy demanded that Zane give him and Bruce trust deeds to the Alpine
Property. 98 Zane agreed to that, and in April 2004 he gave Randy and Bruce each
a trust deed against the Alpine Property to secure their investments. 99 Then in
June 2004, Zane obtained a reconveyance of the trust deed he had given to secure
the financing he had received when he purchased the Alpine Property. 100
At that point, there were six trust deeds encumbering the Alpine Property
to secure over $1,200,000 in investments that Zane's friends and his friends'
friends had made in Beverly Hills. 101
Zane is Charged with Securities Fraud
In early 2005, Zane was charged in Utah with securities fraud. 102 In June
2005, he pled no contest to those charges. 103 Then in August 2005, he signed a
96

R. 1756.

97

R. 1756-57.

98

R. 1756-58.

99

R. 1108-11, 1120-23, 1756-58.

100

R. 1073-74, 1493, 1759.

101

R. 1083-86, 1089-1111, 1115-23, 1175, 1711, 1716-17, 1720, 1740, 1758-59.
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Stipulation and Consent Order with the Division of Securities wherein he
admitted that he had committed securities fraud; that he had "obtained a total of
134 Utah investors" and "raised a total of approxhnately $8 million dollars for

Beverly Hills"; and that he had "received a total of $986,563 in compensation
from Beverly Hills," all while failing to disclose to investors that, a1nong other
things, he was unlicensed to sell securities, the securities were not registered, and
"Lehman Brothers Bank [had] filed a $58 million dollar lawsuit" alleging that
Beverly Hills was "involved in a massive real estate loan fraud scheme." 104
Zane Files for Bankruptcy
In September 2005, Zane filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and his
bankruptcy became "common knowledge" in Tremonton. 105 Mr. McMurdie "had
a conversation with Zane about [his] bankruptcy ... , and [Zane] indicated that
he had gone to considerable expense with an attorney to carve ... [the Alpine
P]roperty and [Mr. McMurdie's] note out of the bankruptcy so [that Mr.
McMurdie] was still okay." 106 Zane assured Mr. McMurdie that "[he] could still

102

R. 1760.

103

R. 1125-38, 1762-63.

104

R. 1149-58, 1761-62.

105

R. 1503, 1517-19, 2625-26.

106

R. 2625.
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plan on being repaid." 107 Because Mr. McMurdie was "[s]till trusting [Zane]" and
~

"had Zane's assurance," Mr. McMurdie did not talk to an attorney or an
accountant about Zane's bankruptcy. I08 The debt Zane owed Mr. McMurdie for
his inveshnent in Beverly Hills was discharged in the bankruptcy, and Zane
came out of the bankruptcy still owning the Alpine Property. 109
Although Mr. McMurdie knew of Zane's bankruptcy, he still did not know
about the criminal charges or the administrative sanctions against Zane. 110
Mr. McMurdie Purchases Ms. Doutre's First-Position Trust Deed
In late 2007 or early 2008, Zane infonned Mr. McMurdie for the first time
of Ms. Doutre' s first-position trust deed against the Alpine Property .111 He also
informed Mr. McMurdie that Ms. Doutre was preparing to foreclose on the
Alpine Property. 112 Zane further told Mr. McMurdie "that if Diana Doutre
foreclosed on her trust deed interest in the Alpine Property, [Mr. McMurdie's]
IRA would lose all of its security interest in the Alpine Property." I13

107

Id.

10s

Id.

l09

R. 1529, 1711.

110

R. 1862-63, 1868, 2625.

111

R. 1276, 1847.

112

R. 1276, 1302-04, 1847-48.

113

R. 1276, 1847.
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Thus, Mr. McMurdie borrowed $120,000 and in February 2008 paid Ms.
Doutre $105,000 for an assignment of her first-position trust deed and $5,000 to

~

cover her attorney fees. 114 Then in June 2008, Mr. McMurdie paid $9,811.61 in
back taxes that he also learned were due on the Alpine Property. 115
Zane Quitclaims the Alpine Property to His Son
A year later, on June 22, 2009, two unsecured investors in Beverly Hills,
Val and Julie Stokes, obtained a $357,000 judgment against Zane. 116 Zane then
transferred the Alpine Property on January 7, 2010, via quitclaim deed to his then
19-year-old son, Luke, who was away serving an LDS mission. 117 Zane did not
tell Mr. McMurdie of his transfer of the Alpine Property. 118
The 2011 Extension Agreement
By early 2011, Mr. McMurdie knew that he had not received an interest
payment since March of 2004. 119 He knew that the deadline for repayment of his
principal had passed on March 24, 2005, and he had learned that he had a sixyear statute of limitation deadline from March 24, 2005, to either sue Zane or get

114

R. 1276, 1299-1301, 1847-48.

115

R. 1276, 1307-09, 1848.

116

R. 1217; 1316-18, 1321.

117

R. 1311-12, 1711, 1768-69, 2243-44.

118

R. 1771.

119

R. 1275.

~
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a reaffinnation of the debt. 120 Mr. McMurdie also believed that the 2001 Trust
Deed still gave him the option of foreclosing on the Alpine Property. 121 At that
point, he also still trusted Zane and believed that Zane was "trying to help [him]
out"; or, as Mr. McMurdie would say later, in hindsight: "I[ was] still drinking
the Kool-Aid." 122
Thus, rather than foreclose on the Alpine Property, Mr. McMurdie went to
Zane and said: "'[Y]ou need to make some kind of payment to me. It can be a
minuscule thing, just something that gives me a renewal on the statute of
limitations."' 123 Zane responded by having an attorney prepare a "LOAN
MODIFICATION, EXTENSION, AND CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT" (the
"Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement"). 124 Zane also prepared, on his
own, a contemporaneous "CONTRACT EXTENSION AGREEMENT" (the
"Zane-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement"). 125 Those agreements (collectively,
the "2011 Extension Agreements") would push the maturity date of Zane's debt
@

@

to Mr. McMurdie to March 24, 2013. 126

120

R. 1852.

121

R. 1847, 1857, 1865-66.

122

R. 1853, 1857.

123

R. 1852.

124

R. 1334-37, 1769-70, 1851-53.

125

R. 1338, 1776-77.

126

R. 1334-38.
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On March 22, 2011, two days before the statute of limitation was to run on
Mr. McMurdie's claims, Mr. McMurdie and Zane signed the 2011 Extension
Agreements. 127 That day Zane also made a $200 payment toward the debt he
owed Mr. McMurdie. 128 Zane explained the purpose of that payment, as follows:
Q.

. .. What was the purpose of this check?

A.

To - for the extension.

Q.

Okay. To buy two more years of no foreclosure?

A.

Yes. 129

Indeed, the Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement asserted:
•

"[T]he 2001 Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (the 'First 2001
Trust Deed') against certain real property located in Utah County,
State of Utah, ... (the 'Secured Property')";

•

"[Zane], either through inadvertence or oversight, executed and
delivered to the Bank of Utah a Second Deed of Trust (the 'Second
2001 Trust Deed') which also secured the 2001 Note";

•

"[T]he First 2001 Trust Deed and the Second 2001 Trust Deed remain
liens of record against the Secured Property"; and

•

"[T]he parties hereto desire to enter into this Modification
Agreement for the purpose of ... memorializing the terms by which
the First 2001 Trust Deed and the Second 2001 Trust Deed will be
released[.]" 130

127

Id.

128

R. 1339, 1857.

129

R. 1778 (emphasis added).

130

R. 1334-35.
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Additionally, 2011 Extension Agree1nents both contained the following tenns:

@

•

"If an event of default occurs under the tenns of ... this ...
Agree1nent, the McMurdies' recourse shall be solely against the
Secured Property and not against Jeppesen personally";

•

"[I]t is understood between the parties that in the event of default,
the sole recourse of the McMurdies is a non-judicial foreclosure
against the Secured Property";

•

"The McMurdies represent and warrant that they have the authority
to ... instruct the Bank of Utah to execute Deeds of Reconveyance to
Jeppesen thereby releasing the Bank of Utah's secured position in
the Secured Property[.]" 131

Moreover, the Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement stated:

•

"[T]he parties mutually stipulate that upon the tender of the
consideration set forth herein ... , the McMurdies shall cause to be
prepared and recorded Deeds of Reconveyance thereby conveying
all of the McMurdies' and/ or Bank of Utah's right, title and interest
in and to the Secured Property to Jeppesen"; and

•

"[T]he McMurdies agree to ... provide Jeppesen with Deeds of
Reconveyance in form and substance satisfactory to Jeppesen prior
to the payment of any sums to the McMurdies pursuant to this
Modification Agreement." 132

G.J)

Finally, the Zane-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement expressly identified the
Alpine Property by its Utah County parcel numbers and then tied the 2011
agreements to the 2001 Note with this language: "Start Date of Original Contract:
24 September 2001." 133

131

R. 1335, 1338.

132

R. 1335.

133

R. 1338.
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At the sa1ne time, the Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement
asserted that" on or about March 24, 2004, the 2001 Note was replaced and
superseded by two Promissory Notes (the '2004 Notes') designating the
McMurdies as lenders and holders of the 2004 Notes." 134 It noted that "the
principal balance owing under the 2004 Notes was increased to Seven Hundred
Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-one and 11/100 Dollars ($700,271.11) although
no additional funds were actually loaned from the McMurdies to Jeppesen." 135
And it said that "[b]y entering into this Modification Agreement, Jeppesen does
not reaffirm the 2004 Notes or other debt, if any, owing the McMurdies that may
predate the Jeppesen Bankruptcy, said debts having been discharged by the
Jeppesen Bankruptcy." 136
Regarding these last-mentioned provisions, Mr. McMurdie testified:
Q.

... And then the sixth whereas says, "Whereas on or about
March 24, 2004, the 2001 note was replaced and superseded by
two promissory notes that they call the 2004 notes designating
the McMurdies as lenders and the holders of the 2004 notes."
So do you recall reading that about the time you signed this?

A.

I'm sure I did.

Q.

So you agree with that statement?

A.

I don't know. I don't know what I was signing for sure.

134

R. 1334.

135

R. 1334.

136

R. 1336.
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~

Q.

Okay.

A.

I must not have disagreed with it or I wouldn't have signed it,
I suppose.

Q.

Okay. And then the next whereas talks about the principal
balance owing under those 2004 notes and how it was increased
to 700,271.11, and then it says," Although no additional funds
were actually loaned from McMurdies to Jeppesen."
And that's correct, right, no additional funds were loaned in
March of 2004 other than - well, the 60,000 was.

QI

A.

Yeah. The 60,000 comes into play there, but -

Q.

Right. A couple days later.

A.

Yeah.

Q.

. .. I'm going to turn over the page.

@

@

And then the second whereas on this page says, "The parties
hereto desire to enter into this modification agreement for the
purpose of modifying, extending, and changing the terms of
the 2004 notes."
So is that - do you agree that was the purpose of this, to
modify the 2004 notes?

137

A.

It was to extend it.

Q.

Extend, yeah, because you were worried about the statute of
limitation.

A.

Yeah. That was my whole purpose. This was just legal - legalese.
I assumed this was all legalese to accomplish that purpose.

Q.

Okay.

A.

If it was other than that, it escaped me. 137

R. 1854-56 (emphasis added).
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In su1n, Mr. McMurdie sim.ply "understood that this was an agreement to extend
the contracts that [he and Zane] had so that [he] avoided the statute of lilnitations

~

and so that e1.1erything continued for another two years and [he] was covered." 138
Zane testified regarding the purpose of the 2011 agree1nents as follows:
Q.

Okay. Would it have been okay if Harry McMurdie foreclosed
on the Al pine property in 2011?

A.

He could have.

Q.

But how would you have felt about it?

A.

I would have been trying to - if it happened, it happened.

~

~

Q.

Okay. But did you understand that if Harry McMurdie signed this
and Shira McMurdie signed this [2011 Attorney-Drafted
Extension Agreement], it would likely buy you two more years
before they would or could foreclose against the Alpine property?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You did understand that?

A.

That's what the extension was, yes.

Q.

But did you understand that [the 2011 Zane-Drafted Extension
Agreement] also would keep the McMurdie's from foreclosing
on the Alpine property until March of 2013?

A.

~

~

~

Yes. 139
~

138

R. 1857 (emphasis added).

139

R. 1771, 1775, 1777 (emphasis added).
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Prior to execution of the 2011 Extension Agreements, Zane did not disclose
to Mr. McMurdie that he had been charged with securities fraud; that he had
been administratively sanctioned by the Utah Division of Securities; or that he
had transferred the Alpine Property to Luke. 140
The 2013 Extension Agreement
As the new maturity date of March 24, 2013, approached, Zane and Mr.
McMurdie entered another "LOAN MODIFICATION, EXTENSION AND
CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT" and another "CONTRACT EXTENSION
AGREEMENT" (the "2013 Extension Agreements"). 141 Those documents, dated
March 22, 2013, also expressly identified the Alpine Property by its Utah County
parcel numbers and referenced the 2001 Note, saying: "Start Date of Original
Contract: 24 September 2001." 142 In connection with the 2013 Extension
Agreements, Zane again paid $200 toward his debt to Mr. McMurdie. 143 The 2013
Extension Agreements set a new maturity date of June 24, 2013. 144
Regarding the 2013 extension agreement, Zane testified:
Q.

What was the purpose of this [2013 extension agreement]?

140

R. 1849-50, 1868.

141

R. 1340-41, 1779.

142

R. 1340-41.

143

R. 1342, 1779-80.

144

R. 1340-41.

@
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~

A.

Another extension.

Q.

To keep Harry McMurdie from foreclosing for three 1nore 1nonths?

A.

Yes. 145

~

Foreclosure and Quiet Title
Sometime after entering the 2011 Extension Agreements and before
entering the 2013 Extension Agreements, Mr. McMurdie learned that Zane had
transferred the Alpine Property to Luke; and, for the first time, "the thoughts of
fraud start[ed] creeping in to [Mr. McMurdie's] mind." 146
Thus, Zane having failed by June 24, 2013, to pay the $500,000 principal
and accrued interest, Mr. McMurdie initiated non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings, and on December 3, 2014, the successor trustee of Mr. McMurdie's
IRA recorded a notice of default on the Alpine Property based on Zane's breach
of the 2001 Note. 147 A foreclosure sale was held on July 23, 2015, and a trustee's
deed conveying the property to Mr. McMurdie' s IRA was recorded five days
later. 148 Luke filed this action the day before the foreclosure sale. 149

145

R. 1779 (emphasis added).

146

R. 1849-50.

147

R. 1347-50.

148

R. 1351-58, 1377-84.

149

R. 1-113.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Luke argued below, and the trial court agreed, that the non-judicial
foreclosure sale in this case was barred as a matter of law by the applicable sixyear statute of limitations. The McMurdie Parties' argument to the contrary was,
and is, two-fold. First, if the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements,
Gj

and 2013 Extension Agreements were reneioals and extensions of the 2001 Nate,
the foreclosure was timely since it occurred within six years of Zane's default
under the 2013 Extension Agreements and the debt remained secured by the 2001
Trust Deed. Because there is ample evidence that Zane and Mr. McMurdie
intended for the 2003 Note, 2004 Note, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013

~

Extension Agreements to renew and extend the 2001 Note, the trial court erred
when it granted summary judgment and held as a matter of law that the 2001
Nate had instead been superseded.
Second, even if the 2003, 2004, 2011, and 2013 documents did not renew
@

and extend the 2001 Note, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Luke should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations since he is in

@

privity with Zane and there is evidence that Zane fraudulently induced Mr.
McMurdie to reasonably forego initiating the foreclosure within the limitation
period. Because this material issue of disputed fact remains, the trial court
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should not have granted summary judgment, even if the 2003, 2004, 2011, and
2013 docu1nents did not renew and extend the 2001 Note.
Although in the trial court the McMurdie Parties £rained this second
II

argument in tenns of the equitable discovery rule" instead of in terms of
11

equitable estoppel," they relied below on the sa1ne evidence that they rely on

here, and they cited case law that articulates the equitable estoppel doctrine that
they rely on here. Thus, the equitable estoppel argument the McMurdie Parties
make here was preserved. And, if it was not, the Court should address it under
the plain error exception to the preservation rule.

6lJ

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING AS A MATTER OF LAW
THAT THE 2001 NOTE WAS SUPERSEDED AND NOT RENEWED
AND, THUS, THAT THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS BARRED BY THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A.

A new promissory note or contract may serve either to renew
and extend a prior debt or to supersede and extinguish it.

A new promissory note or contract may serve to renew and extend a prior
debt or to supersede and extinguish it, as the Utah Supre1ne Court has explained:
Nor does the giving of a new note in renewal of another note
extinguish the debt for which the original note was given unless it
appears that it was the intention of the parties that the execution of
the new note and the cancellation of the old note should extinguish
the debt represented by the old note.

First SecurihJ Bank of Utah v. Proudfit Sporting Goods Co., 552 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah
1976). Shnilarly, this Court has said that" one contract will not supersede another
34
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iJ

111

unless it is plainly shown that [such] was the intent of the parties[.]"'" Ward v.

IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 362, ,r 8, 173 P.3d 186 (citations 01nitted).
Indeed, this provision of the 2001 note signed individually by Zane affirms that it
could be renewed and extended: "The makers ... hereof ... consent to any and
all extensions of time ... [or] renewals ... that may be granted by the holder
~

hereof with respect to the pay1nent or other provisions of this note[.]" (R. 1056.)

B.

Whether the trustee's sale in this case occurred within the
applicable limitation period turns on whether the 2001 Note
was renewed and extended or superseded and extinguished.

In this case, the renewal effect of subsequent promissory notes and
contracts is material because the foreclosure sale here took place on July 23, 2015,
based on a trust deed executed in 2001 and a promissory note with an original
maturity date of March 24, 2003. Because Utah has no 12-year statute of
limitation, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-2-301 et seq., without a subsequent
extension or extensions of the original debt, the trustee's sale here would have
Crib

been outside the limitation period and void. On the other hand, with appropriate
extensions, the trustee's sale could have taken place within the limitation period
and, thus, be valid. Whether the trustee's sale here was within the applicable
limitation period turns, therefore, on whether the 2001 Note was renewed and
extended by the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agree1nents, and 2013
Extension Agreements or was superseded and extinguished by them.
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~

The trustee's sale here was based on the 2001 Trust Deed, which secured
the obligation created by the 2001 Note. (R. 1089-96). "[A] trustee's sale of
property under a trust deed [1nust] be made ... within the period prescribed by
law for the commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust
deed." Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-34 (2010). 150 The period for the commencement of
an action "upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument
in writing," such as the 2001 Note and any writings extending that note, is "six
years." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2) (2012).
The 2001 Note's initial maturity date was March 24, 2003. (R. 1056, 1058.)
However, on March 24, 2003, Zane executed the 2003 Note, which referenced the
2001 Note debt and the Alpine Property and set a new maturity date of March
24, 2004. (R. 1060.)
On March 24, 2004, Zane executed the 2004 Notes, which also referenced
the 2001 Note debt and the Alpine Property and stated a new maturity date of
March 24, 2005. (R. 1062-66.) Zane failed to timely pay the principal and interest

~

by the new 1naturity date, and a cause of action thus accrued in favor of Mr.
McMurdie on March 24, 2005. See State Tax Comm'n v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575,

Section 57-1-34 was amended in 2016, but the amendrnent did not go into
effect until after the trustee's sale in this case, see Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-34
(Supp. 2016); thus, the prior version applies here.

150
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~

577 (Utah 1940) ("Ordinarily, a cause of action for a debt [accrues] when the debt
is due and payable[.]")
On March 22, 2011, two days before the six-year limitation period was to
run on Mr. McMurdie's cause of action under the 2004 Notes, Mr. McMurdie and
Zane signed the 2011 Extension Agreements, each of which stated a new
(j

maturity date of March 24, 2013. (R. 1334-38.) Then on March 22, 2013, Zane and
Mr. McMurdie signed the 2013 Extension Agreements, which again moved the
loan maturity date, this time to June 24, 2015. (R. 1340-41.)
Zane then defaulted under the 2013 Extension Agreements by failing to
pay the principal and interest by the new maturity date, June 24, 2015. (R. 1750.)
Thus, on June 24, 2015, a claim again accrued in favor of Mr. McMurdie, see State

Tax Comm'n, 100 P.2d at 577, and the foreclosure sale took place on July 23, 2015,
within six years of when that claim accrued. (R. 1351-58, 1377-81.)
In sum, if the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013
Extension Agreements each renewed the 2001 Note debt, the foreclosure sale to
enforce that debt took place within the statute of limitations. 151 On the other

Zane's bankruptcy and the discharge therein of his debt to Mr. McMurdie
does not change the foregoing analysis since a "moral obligation [to pay a
discharged debt] continues precisely the same as though no discharge had been
made," and u[t]hat moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a new
promise whenever the promise may be made." Merchants' Protective Ass'n v.
Popper, 204 P. 107, 110 (Utah 1922); accord Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625,629
(1913). "The theory is that the discharge destroys the remedy, but not the
1s1
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hand, if the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agree1nents, or 2013
Extension Agreements superseded and extinguished the 2001 Note debt, the
foreclosure sale was outside the limitation period.
C.

Whether the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements,
and 2013 Extension Agreements renewed and extended the 2001
Note debt or superseded and extinguished it depends on the
intent of the parties.

Whether a subsequent promissory note or contract renews and extends a
prior debt or supersedes and extinguishes it depends on the intent of the parties.

See First Security, 552 P.2d at 124; Ward, 2007 UT App 362, ,r 8, 173 P.3d 186. The
II

Utah Supreme Court made that plain. when it said that giving ... a new note in
renewal of another note [does not] extinguish the debt for which the original note
iJ

was given unless it appears that it was the intention of the parties that the
execution of the new note ... should extinguish the debt represented by the old
note." First Security, 552 P.2d at 124 (emphasis added). This Court has likewise

(I)

said that "one contract will not supersede another "'unless it is plainly shown that

[such.] was the intent of the parties[.]""' Ward, 2007 UT App 362, ,r 8, 173 P.3d 186
(citations 01nitted) (emphasis added). Summarizing Utah law, the Federal
11

District Court for the District of Utah likewise concluded: [T]he intent of the
indebtedness." Zavelo, 227 U.S. at 629.
Nor does Zane's quitclaim transfer of the property to Luke change the
analysis since "'[a] grantee under a quitclaim deed acquires only the interest of
his granter."' Durbano & Garn Inv. Co. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2014 UT App 150,
,r 8,330 P.3d 119 (citations omitted).
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(jJ

parties should control the 'renewal' effect of subsequent promissory notes."

Peterson v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Utah 1981) (citing Marking Sys.,
Inc. v. Interwest Film Corp., 567 P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1977); Interstate Trust Co. v.
Headlund, 171 P. 515,517 (Utah 1918) (on petition for rehearing); Deseret Nat'l
Bank v. Burton, 53 P. 215, 221 (Utah 1898))).
In "ascertaining the intention of the parties" with respect to the renewal
effect of a subsequent promissory note, courts should take into account" the facts
and circu1nstances attending [the parties'] transactions." Gray v. Kappas, 61 P.2d
613,615 (Utah 1936). Additionally, "[i]n determining whether an agreement was
intended to supersede a prior agreement, the court may 'consider extrinsic
evidence as to the circumstances of the transaction, including the purpose for
which the contested agreement was made."' Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346,
1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).
Thus, whether the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and
@

2013 Extension Agreements renewed and extended the 2001 Note debt or
superseded and extinguished it depends on the intent of Zane and Mr.

@

McMurdie, see First Security, 552 P.2d at 124; Ward, 2007 UT App 362, 1 8, 173
P.3d 186; Peterson, 511 F. Supp. at 255, and this Court must take into account all
the facts and circu1nstances attending Zane and Mr. McMurdie's transactions to
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determine whether there is a genuine issue of 1naterial fact regarding their intent,

see Gray, 61 P.2d at 615; Horman, 740 P.2d at 1351.
D.

Ample evidence indicates that Zane and Mr. McMurdie intended
the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and 2013
Extension Agreements to renew and extend the 2001 Note debt.

1.

~

Ample evidence indicates that the 2003 Note was intended
to renew and extend the 2001 Note.

Under the 2001 Note, the entire principal and interest on Mr. McMurdie's
$500,000 investment was to come due on March 24, 2003. (R. 1056, 1058.) Mr.
McMurdie testified by affidavit that as that date approached, he and Zane agreed
to "extend" the maturity date of the 2001 Note. (R. 1274 (emphasis added).) Zane
prepared the 2003 Note to document the extension; and, on the 2003 Note, he
listed the same principal amount as on the 2001 Note. (R. 1060, 1272.) Zane also
listed his Alpine Property as the "PROPERTY ADDRESS," even though he
created no new trust deed in connection with the 2003 Note. (R. 1060, 1274.)
The timing of the 2003 Note; Zane's listing of the same principal amount
on the 2003 and 2001 Notes; and his listing of the Alpine Property on the 2003
Note as the "PROPERTY ADDRESS" when the only trust deed he had issued
was the one associated with the 2001 Note, all suggest that Zane intended the
2003 Note to renew and extend his obligation under the 2001 Note. Mr.
McMurdie' s affidavit testimony that he and Zane agreed in March 2003 to
"extend" the 2001 Note suggests that Mr. McMurdie's intent was the sa1ne.
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~

2.

Ample evidence indicates that the 2004 Notes were intended
to renew and extend the 2001 Note.

Mr. McMurdie testified by affidavit that in March 2004, as the new
maturity date for Mr. McMurdie's inveshnent neared, Zane proposed that Mr.
McMurdie "extend the debt on the original $500,000 promissory note investment
for [one more] year." (R. 1275, 1470-72 (emphasis added).) Mr. McMurdie
accepted Zane's proposal, and Zane prepared the 2004 Notes. (R. 1062-63, 106566, 1275.) The 2004 Notes each stated that a "Deed of Trust ... , dated the same
date as [the] Note[s], protects the Note Holder frmn possible losses which might
result if [Zane does] not keep the promises which [he made] in [the] Note[s]." (R.
~

1063, 1066.) The 2004 Notes then, again, listed Zane's Alpine Property as the
"PROPERTY ADDRESS." (R. 1063, 1066, 1554.) And Mr. McMurdie testified by
affidavit that after execution of the 2004 Notes he "believed ... that [his]
investments ... were [still] fully secured by the Alpine Property." (R. 1275.)
Again, the timing of the 2004 Notes alone suggests that they were intended
to renew and extend Zane's 2001 debt, as does t~e fact that together the 2004
Notes promised payment of the exact original principal of $500,000 and interest
in the amount that Zane and Mr. McMurdie believed to then be owing on the

2001 debt. The fact that the 2004 Notes indicated an intent that they be secured
@

by a trust deed; that the only trust deed iI1 existence between Zane and Mr.
McMurdie was the 2001 Trust Deed; and that the 2004 Notes both listed the
41
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Alpine Property as the "PROPERTY ADDRESS" also suggests that the intent was
for the 2004 Notes to renew and extend the 2001 Note. Mr. McMurdie's belief
that his investment was still secured after execution of the 2004 Notes also
supports this conclusion.
Moreover, Zane himself testified, as follows, that his intent with the 2004
Notes was to extend the 2001 Note, not to supersede it:
Q.

Okay. And similar to the contract extension that you did with
Diana Doutre, you were rolling over Harry McMurdie's debt
into new promissory notes on March 24, 2004, weren't you?

A.

Extending?

Q.

Extending, rolling over, whatever you want to call it.

A.

Yes.

~

~

(R. 1754-55 (emphasis added).)
Finally, the circumstance related to Mr. McMurdie's purchase of an
assignment of Ms. Doutre' s trust deed also indicate that Zane and Mr. McMurdie
intended the 2003 and 2004 Notes to renew and extend the 2001 Note. Zane
would not have suggested that Mr. McMurdie purchase an assignment of Ms.
Doutre' s trust deed, and Mr. McMurdie would not have acted on that
suggestion, unless the two of them believed that the 2003 and 2004 Notes had
renewed and extended the 2001 Note. Yet in late 2007, Zane informed Mr.
McMurdie of Ms. Doutre' s first-position trust deed, told him of her intent to
foreclose on the Al pine Property, and said "tha t if Diana Dou tre foreclosed on
42
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her trust deed interest in. the Alpine Property, [Mr. McMurdie's] IRA would lose
all of its security interest in the Alpine Property." (R. 1276, 1302-04, 1847-48.) The
fact that Zane told Mr. McMurdie that he needed to purchase an assigrunent of
Ms. Doutre' s trust deed in order to not lose his security interest in the Alpine
Property indicates that Zane intended the 2003 and 2004 Notes to extend the 2001
<.@

Note. Likewise, the fact that Mr. McMurdie borrowed $120,000, paid Ms. Doutre
for an assignment of her first-position trust deed, covered her attorney fees, and
paid the past-due property taxes on the Alpine Property (see R. 1276, 1299-1301,
1307-09, 1847-48) indicates that Mr. McMurdie also intended the 2003 and 2004
Notes to extend the 2001 Note and thereby keep his investment secured.
3.

Ample evidence indicates that the 2011 Extension Agreements
we1 e intended to renew and extend the 2001 Note.
1

The Zane-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement identified the "Start Date" of
the "Original Contract" that it was meant to" extend" as "24 September 2001,"
the date of the 2001 Note. (R. 1056, 1058, 1338.) The Attorney-Drafted 2011
Extension Agreement then noted that "the 2001 Note was secured by [the 2001
Trust Deed]" and that the 2001 Trust Deed "remain[ed a lien] of record against
the Secured Property." (R. 1334-35.) It then said that its purpose was to
"memorializ[e] the terms by which the [2001 Trust Deed] will be released." (R.
@

1334-35.) And, both 2011 Extension Agreements said that Mr. McMurdie's sole
recourse in the event of Zane's breach would be a "non-judicial foreclosure
43
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against the Secured Property." (R. 1335, 1338.) Finally, the Attorney-Drafted 2011
Extension Agreement stated that, upon Zane's payment of his debt, "the
McMurdies shall cause to be prepared and recorded Deeds of Reconveyance
thereby conveying all of the McMurdies' and/ or Bank of Utah's right, title and
interest in and to the Secured Property to [Zane]." (R. 1335.)
The fact that Zane and Mr. McMurdie agreed that the date of the contract
being extended by the 2011 Extension Agreements was September 24, 2001,
together with the fact that the 2011 Extension Agreements repeatedly represent
that the debt they document is secured by the 2001 Trust Deed, indicates that

~

Zane and Mr. McMurdie intended the 2011 Extension Agreements to be a further
renewal and extension of the 2001 Note.
Indeed, Zane expressly testified that the purpose of the 2011 agreements
was to effectuate an "extension" that would "keep the McMurdies from
foreclosing on the Alpine property until March 2013." (R. 1771, 1775, 1777.)
Additionally, Zane paid Mr. McMurdie $200 on the day he signed the 2011
Extension Agree1nents and testified that the purpose of that payment was to
effectuate an "extension" and "buy two more years of no foreclosure." (R. 1339,
1778, 1857.) Zane's expectation that the 2011 Extension Agreements would "keep

the McMurdies from foreclosing on the Alpine property" for two more years
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(id:)

further indicates his intent for the 2011 Extension Agreements to be a renewal
and extension of the 2001 Note, the only one secured by a trust deed.
Finally, Mr. McMurdie testified that he also understood the purpose of the
Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agree1nent was to "extend the contracts ... so
that everything continued for another two years and [he] was covered." (R. 1857
Gl)

(emphasis added).) Mr. McMurdie's expectation that the 2011 agreement caused
"everything" to be "extend[ed]" and "continued" indicates that he intended that
agreement to be a renewal and extension of the 2001 Note. His understanding
that the 2011 agreements kept him" covered" indicates his belief that his
investment was still secured by the 2001 Trust Deed.

4.

~

Ample evidence indicates that the 2013 Extension Agreements
were intended to renew and extend the 2001 Note.

Like the Zane-Drafted 2011 Extension Agree1nent, the 2013 Extension
Agreements both identified the "Start Date" of the "Original Contract" that they
were meant to "extend" as "24 September 2001," the date of the 2001 Note. (R.
1340-41.) The 2013 Extension Agreements also identified the Alpine Property by

its Utah County parcel numbers (id.), and Zane testified that the "purpose" of the
2013 Extension Agreements was to effectuate "[a]nother extension" that would

again "keep Harry McMurdie from foreclosing." (R. 1779.) This evidence again
indicates that Zane's and Mr. McMurdie's intent with the 2013 Extension
Agreements was to again renew and extend the 2001 Note.
45
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5.

The existence of evidence suggesting that the 2003, 2004, 2011,
and 2013 documents were intended to supe1·sede the 2001 Note
simply c1·eates a factual issue that makes the frial cou1·t's
g,·ant of summary judgment imprope1".

Admittedly, the trial court identified evidence suggesting a contrary
intent-an intent for the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements,
and/or 2013 Extension Agreements to supersede the 2001 Note. (R. 3040.)
Specifically, the trial court stated:
The [Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension] Agreement unambiguously
states that "the 2001 Note was replaced and superseded by [the 2004
Notes] designating the McMurdies as lenders and holders of the
2004 Notes." Moreover, the 2004 Notes substitute different parties
(Harry and Shira McMurdie and the McMurdie Family Trust in lieu
of the McMurdie IRA) as well as different amounts (the $200,271.11
interest which had accrued on the 2001 Note) and different interest
rates (sixteen percent compounded in lieu of twelve percent).

(Id. (second alteration in original).) Actually, the trial court could have identified
even more evidence in support of its conclusion, including this statement in the
~

Attorney-Drafted 2011 Extension Agreement: "By entering into this Modification
Agreement, Jeppesen does not reaffirm the 2004 Notes or other debt, if any,
owing the McMurdies that may predate the Jeppesen Bankruptcy, said debts
having been discharged by the Jeppesen Bankruptcy." (R. 1336.)
However, the existence of conflicting evidence on the issue of whether the
2001 Note was renewed or superseded merely confirms that the trial court's
grant of summary judgment was improper. As the Utah Supreme Court has said:
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[A] district court is precluded from granting su1runary judgment if
the facts shown by the evidence on a summary judgment motion
support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a
pivotal issue in the case ... particularly if the issue turns on
credibility or if the inferences depend upon subject feelings or intent.

@

~

IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73,

,r 18, 196 P.3d 588

(internal quotations and citation omitted); accord Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete
CnhJ., 2002 UT 17,

,r 24, 42 P.3d 379.

Here, there is more than one plausible inference that can be drawn from
the evidence. The district court weighed the conflicting evidence, drew an
inference, and then concluded as a matter of law that Zane and Mr. McMurdie
intended for the 2001 Note to be superseded. That was error. See IHC Health

Servs., 2008 UT 73, ,118, 196 P.3d 588; Pigs Gun Club, 2002 UT 17, ,r 24, 42 P.3d
379. This Court should correct the error by reversing the grant of summary
judgment and remanding for trial on the issue of whether Zane and Mr.
McMurdie intended the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011 Extension Agreements, and
<j

2013 Extension Agreements to renew and extend the 2001 Note or supersede it.
II.

4j

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD THAT FACTUAL
ISSUES EXIST AS TO WHETHER LUKE IS ESTOPPED FROM
ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AGAINST A
FORECLOSURE OF THE 2001 TRUST DEED.

Even if the trustee's sale here occurred outside the limitation period, this
@

Court should hold that the trial court erred by failing to hold that factual issues
exist as to whether Luke is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations.

47

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, when the conduct
of one party or his privies reasonably induces another to
delay commencing an action, the first party may be
precluded from asserting the statute of limitations.

~

Under Utah law, "[o]ne cam1ot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a
false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and
then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought."

Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969). In other words, "[w]here
the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of [one party], or
his privies ... , [the delay] cannot be availed of by [that party or his privies] as a
defense." Id.; see also Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah
1983) ("[C]oncealment or misleading by a party prevents that party from relying
on the statute of limitations."); Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435,437 (Utah 1973)
(" Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an estoppel against pleading the
Statute of Limitations."), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Scott v.

Sch. Bd. of Granite Sch. Dist., 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977); Anderson v. Cercone,
180 P. 586, 589-90 (Utah 1919) ('"[W]hen a defendant, electing to set up the
statute of limitations, previously by deception or any violation of duty towards
plaintiff has caused him to subject his claim to the statutory bar, he must be
charged with having wrongfully obtained an advantage which equity will not
allow him to hold."' (citation omitted)).
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'iv

The foregoing doctrine is known as "equitable estoppel." Baldassin v.

Freeman, 2009 UT App 109U, 2009 WL 1089551, para. 9 (mem.); Anderson, 180 P.
at 589-90. "In determining whether equitable estoppel should apply to prevent a
party from asserting a statute of limitations defense, courts employ a three-part
analytical framework." Baldassin, 2009 UT App 109U, 2009 WL 1089551, para. 9.
<@

"First, there must be' a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party

inconsistent with a claim later asserted."' Id. (citation omitted). "Second, there
must be 'reasonable action or inaction by the other party, taken on the basis of
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act."' Id. (citation omitted).
"Finally, there must be 'injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act,
or failure to act."' Id. (citation omitted).

B.

There is a genuine dispute of material fact in this case as to
each element of equitable estoppel.

1.

Zane's statements, actions, and failures to act between
2003 and 2013 ate inconsistent with the cun~ent claim
that the 2001 Note was supei-seded.

In the 2003 and 2004 Notes, Zane listed his Alpine Property over the
<j

heading "PROPERTY ADDRESS" and otherwise led Mr. McMurdie to believe
that the 2001 Note was being renewed and remained secured by the 2001 Trust
Deed. (R. 1060, 1062, 1065, 1274-75.) Those representations are inconsistent with
Luke's current assertion that the 2001 Note was superseded by the 2004 Notes.
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In late 2007 and early 2008, Zane again conveyed the message that Mr.
McMurdie could still enforce the 2001 Note and Trust Deed when he told Mr.
McMurdie that he would need to purchase an assignment of Ms. Doutre' s trust
deed in order to keep his inveshnent secured by the Alpine Property. (R. 1276,
1302-04, 1847-48.) That message is also inconsistent with Luke's current assertion
that the 2001 Note was superseded by the 2004 Notes.
Again in 2011 and 2013, Zane represented that the 2001 Note and Trust
Deed were still enforceable when he included statements in the 2011 Extension
Agreements about Mr. McMurdie's sole recourse being "a non-judicial
foreclosure against the Secured Property" and statements in the 2011 and 2013
Extension Agreements that the "Start Date" of the "Original Contract" being
extended was "24 September 2001." (R. 1335, 1338, 1340-41.) Those
representations are also inconsistent with Luke's current assertion that an action
under the 2001 Note is time barred.
Finally, Zane failed to disclose to Mr. McMurdie that he had paid only
$240,000 for the 4.82 acre Alpine Property and instead told Mr. McMurdie that
the Alpine Property "was worth up to $500,000 per acre." (R. 1272, 1711, 1720.)
He promised Mr. McMurdie a first-position trust deed when he knew that Ms.
Doutre's trust deed already encumbered the property. (R. 1271-73, 1723, 1729-30,
1732-33.) And, at relevant times, he failed to tell Mr. McMurdie that he had
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ad1nitted to illegally selling unregistered securities in Idaho; did not have a
license to sell securities in Utah; had not registered the pro1nissory note securities
he was then selling; had been charged with securities fraud and been
administratively sanctioned in Utah; and had quitclahned the Alpine Property to
Luke in January of 2010. (R. 1177, 1741-42, 1272-73, 1849-50, 1868.) Zane's
foregoi11.g actions amount to "'deception ... [that also arguably] ... caused [Mr.
McMurdie] to subject his claim to the statutory bar,"' Anderson, 180 P. at 589-90
(citation omitted). The trial court even found that" Zane Jeppesen' s promissory
note investments and the Modification Agreement were part of a securities fraud
scam." (R. 2730.) In other words, there is evidence from which a fact-finder could
find that Zane '"wrongfully obtained an advantage, which equity will not allow
him to hold."' Anderson, 180 P. at 589-90 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, if the Court concludes that the 2003 Note, 2004 Notes, 2011
Extension Agreements, and/ or 2013 Extension Agreements superseded the 2001
@

Note and, thus, that the foreclosure sale in this case occurred outside the statute
of limitations, there is at least a factual issue on the first element of equitable

@

estoppel, which is"' a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party

inconsistent with a claim later asserted,"' Baldassin, 2009 UT App 109U, 2009 WL
1089551, para. 9 (citation omitted).
Ci

51

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Whether M1'·. McMu1"die's failure to fo1"eclose on the
Alpine P1"operty within the applicable limitation period
was J"easonable presents a question offact.

The second element of equitable estoppel is "'reasonable action or inaction
by the other party, taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission,
act, or failure to act."' Id. (citation 01nitted). In analyzing a claim under the
equitable discovery rule, which has its "genesis in estoppel," the Utah Supreme
Court said that whether a person "acted reasonably in failing to file [his]

Gv

complaint within the limitations period [is a] question[] appropriately reserved
for the fact-finder." Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r 45, 108 P.3d
741. Thus, there is at least a factual issue as to the second element of equitable
estoppel as well-whether whether Mr. McMurdie acted reasonably when he
waited until 2014 to initiate foreclosure under the 2001 Trust Deed. Cf. State v.

Richardson, 843 P.2d 517,523 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In the negligence setting,
for example, whether a person acted reasonably is a question of fact unless 'fixed
by law' by legislation or prior judicial decision." (citation 01nitted)).
3.

Mr. McMurdie will be injured if Zane is allowed to
contJ"adict the 1"epresentations he niade 1"egarding
1"enewal and extension of the 2001 Note.

As to the last element of equitable estoppel-"'injury to the second party
[by] allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate [his] statement[s],
admission[s], act[s], or failure[s] to act,"' Baldassin, 2009 UT App 109U, 2009 WL
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1089551, para. 9 (citation omitted)-if Zane is allowed to assert the statute of
limitations and thereby void the foreclosure sale after repeatedly representing to
Mr. McMurdie that the 2001 Note was being renewed and Mr. McMurdie's
inveshnent remained secured by the Alpine Property, Mr. McMurdie will lose
any security for his $500,000 investment and, thus, be injured.

4.

Zane is Luke's ptivy.

Finally, equitable estoppel may be asserted against a party or his privies if
he induced another to delay in commencing an action. Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist.,
456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969). "The term 'privity' is defined as a mutual or
successive relationship to the same right or property." Glen Allen Mining Co. v.

Park Galena Mining Co., 296 P. 231,233 (Utah 1931). Where Luke is Zane's grantee
of the Alpine Property under a quitclaim deed that conveyed "'only the interest
of [Zane],"' Durbano & Garn Inv. Co. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2014 UT App 150, ,r
8, 330 P.3d 119 (citations omitted), Zane is a privy of Luke. 152 Thus, estoppel may
<@

be asserted against Luke based on the conduct of Zane. See Rice, 456 P.2d at 163.

In the trial court, the McMurdie Parties moved for a determination that Luke
was not only in privity with Zane but that he also acted as Zane's agent with
respect to the Alpine Property and in bringing a quiet title action in an attempt to
defeat the non-judicial foreclosure sale. (R. 2643-58.) In light of its grant of
summary judgment against the McMurdie Parties, the trial court never reached
the issue of whether Luke was also acting as Zane's agent. (R. 2718-20.)
1s2

@

@
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****
In sum, because there is evidence to support each element of equitable

estoppel and Luke is in privity with Zane, the trial court erred by failing to hold
that factual issues exist as to whether Luke is estopped from asserting the statute
of limitation against a foreclosure of the 2001 Trust Deed.

C.

The McMurdie Parties adequately preserved their equitable
estoppel argument.

In the trial court, the McMurdie Parties made the foregoing equitable
estoppel argument in terms of the "equitable discovery rule" and cited equitable
discovery rule cases. Notwithstanding that mistake in nomenclature, the
McMurdie Parties still adequately preserved their equitable estoppel argument.
"To preserve an argument for appellate review, the appellant must first
present the argument to the district court 'in such a way that the court has an
opportunity to rule on [it]."' Gowe v. Intennountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App
105, ,i- 7,356 P.3d 683 (citation omitted). Preservation usually requires the party
who raises an issue on appeal to have first "provide[d] the trial court with ...
legal authority" on that issue. Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). Preservation also requires a party seeking review of a summary judgment
~

motion to have made the same factual argument in the trial court that he makes
on appeal. See Gowe, 2015 UT App 105, ,i-,i- 8-9, 356 P.3d 683.
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The McMurdie Parties provided the trial court with legal authority for the
equitable estoppel argmnent they make here. Specifically, they quoted Russell

Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741, which admittedly discusses
the "equitable discovery rule" but, in that context, states that

111

equitable

estoppel'" occurs when "'a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing of a
(£1)

cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense
to the action"' and that a party asserting equitable estoppel "'must demonstrate
that, "given the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
brought suit within the statutory period.""' (R. 1691, 2604 (quoting Russell

Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,r 25, 108 P.3d 741 (additional citation omitted).) The
McMurdie Parties also quoted Russell Packard in the trial court, as follows, for the
rationale for equitable estoppel:

.(/If we were to look only to whether a plaintiff theoretically could
have brought a suit before the limitations period expired without
looking to the relative reasonableness or unreasonableness of that
action under the circumstances, we would reward a defendant's
fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by depriving an innocent
plaintiff of a reasonable period within which to act. This we refuse to
do. '[T]o permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing it to
plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did
not know of and could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered the fraud' would be 'not only subversive of good morals,
but also contrary to the plainest principles of justice."'

(R. 1691, 2604 (quoting Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,r 25, 108 P.3d 741 (citation
omitted)).)
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CL

Additionally, the McMurdie Parties relied in the trial court on many of the
same facts that they now cite here in support of their equitable estoppel

~

argument. Specifically, the McMurdie Parties asserted below that Luke should be
precluded from asserting the statute of limitations based on the fact that (1) "[£]or
a dozen years after Zane ... sold a $500,000 promissory note investment to the
McMurdie Parties ... Zane Jeppesen continued to tell [Mr.] McMurdie that the
McMurdie Parties would be paid back their ... investment, with interest"; (2) the
2011 and 2013 Extension Agreements purported to extend the time for Mr.
McMurdie to be able to foreclose on the Alpine Property; (3) "Zane Jeppesen
approached [Mr.] McMurdie to buy the Alpine Property out of foreclosure
proceedings in 2008 by buying Diana Doutre's first position trust deed"; and (4)
Zane "did not tell [Mr.] McMurdie that Zane ... had quitclaimed the Alpine
Property to Luke." (R. 1692-95, 2601.)

~

Again, the McMurdie Parties admittedly did not frame their argument
below in terms of "equitable estoppel," but rather in terms of "the equitable
discovery rule," which "is essentially a claim of equitable estoppel" that applies
in the particular circumstance where "a plaintiff does not [even] become aware of

the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct," Warren v. Provo CihJ Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Utah 1992). (See R.
1690-95, 2597-97, 2603-06.) And, because the McMurdie Parties made their trial
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~

court argu1nent in terms of the "discovery rule" instead of "estoppel," the trial
@

court ruled against them by holding that the discovery rule does not apply in a
case like this where Mr. McMurdie was not kept from discovering his cause of
action against Zane. (R. 2731-34, 3039.) However, under Patterson v. Patterson,
2011 UT 68,266 P.3d 828, the McMurdie Parties' 1nislabeled estoppel argument

was still adequately preserved.

In Patterson, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the
Gj

court for a declaration that a particular amendment to a trust was void. Id.

,r 4.

He then moved for summary judgment based on a Banks case. Id. The defendant
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and argued in the trial court that the

Banks case should be overturned. Id. In making that argument, the defendant did
not cite the Utah Uniform Trust Code (UUTC), which had already statutorily
overturned Banks. Id.

,r 4. Based on the arguments presented to it, the Patterson

trial court refused to overturn Banks and, instead, granted summary judgment in
Cj

favor of the plaintiff. Id.

,r 5.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the UUTC had already statutorily
overturned Banks. Id.

,r 8. But the plaintiff contended that the Supre1ne Court

"should not consider [the defendant's] statutory argument because [he] raised it
for the first time on appeal." Id.
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Gt

The Supreme Court noted that the defendant had raised in the trial court
the issue of "whether ... Banks should be overruled" and observed that appellate
courts "routinely consider new authority relevant to issues that have properly
been preserved." Id.

,r,r 11, 18. The Supreme Court then said that where the issue

of overturning Banks had been raised below, it was "unwilling to disregard
controlling authority that bears upon the ultimate resolution of [that issue] solely
because the parties did not raise it below." Id.

,r 18.

In other words, the defendant made the right argument in the trial court
but failed to cite the correct authority to support it. See id.

,r,r 11, 18, 20. The

Supreme Court acknowledged that its willingness to address the argument that

Banks should be overruled, even though the defendant failed in the trial court to
cite the controlling authority, might "undermine some of the policies underlying
the preservation requirement." Id.

,r 19. "For example, had [the defendant] raised

and argued the applicability of the UUTC in the district court, the court may
have ruled in [his] favor and [the] appeal would have been avoided." Id.
However, the Supreme Court pointed to "other important considerations
that cut against application of the preservation rule in [that] situation." Id.

,r 20.
ii

Those considerations included the fact that" the issue of whether and how the
UUTC applies [was] one that [could] be resolved purely as a matter of law"; that
"the failure to raise the argument below appear[ed] to have been inadvertent,
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V,

rather than tactical"; and that "parties have an ethical obligation to disclose
adverse authority to the court" and "refus[al] to apply the [controlling authority
on appeal] ... could incentivize [opposing] attorneys to disregard their ethical
~

obligation to point out controlling adverse authority." Id.

,r 20.

This case falls within the framework of Patterson. Just as the Patterson
~

defendant argued below that Banks ought to be overturned but failed to cite the
controlling authority, here the McMurdie parties argued below that Zane's
fraudulent conduct should estop Luke from asserting a statute of limitations
defense, but they failed to cite controlling authority on equitable estoppel.
Instead, they cited authority on the equitable discovery rule, a subcategory under

~

the larger estoppel umbrella. Despite the Patterson defendant's misstep in the
trial court, the Supreme Court allowed him to cite on appeal the controlling
~

authority in support of his argument. So here, despite the McMurdie Parties'
misstep in the trial court, this Court should allow the McMurdie Parties to cite

(j

here controlling authorities in support of their equitable estoppel argument and
to identify correctly the theory on which they rely-equitable estoppel.

(j

Admittedly, just as the Patterson appeal could have been avoided had the
defendant cited the proper authority from the get-go, this appeal might have
been avoided if the McMurdie Parties had relied on "equitable estoppel" and
equitable estoppel cases fro1n the outset. However, the countervailing
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considerations that applied in Patterson apply equally here. Specifically, whether
summary judgment was proper on the issue of equitable estoppel is an issue that
can be resolved as a matter of law. Additionally, the McMurdie Parties failure to
frame their argument in tenns of estoppel rather that the discovery rule was
inadvertent, not tactical, as evidenced by the fact that there was "no way in
which [they] would derive an advantage from reserving the [estoppel] argument
~

for appeal." Id. Finally, the McMurdie Parties' "failure to raise the controlling
[estoppel doctrine] in the district court is a failure that can be appropriately
assigned to counsel for both parties," and a "refus[al] to apply [that doctrine]
here ... could incentivize attorneys to disregard their ethical obligation to point
out controlling adverse authority." Id. For all of these reasons, the Court should
conclude that the McMurdie Parties' equitable estoppel argument was
adequately preserved.
D.

If the McMurdie Parties did not adequately preserve their
equitable estoppel argument, the Court should address it
under the plain error exception to the preservation rule.

Even if the McMurdie Parties did not adequately preserve their equitable
estoppel argument, the Court should address it under the plain error exception
to the preservation rule. "When a party raises an issue on appeal that was not
preserved below, [Utah's appellate courts will] review it under the plain error
standard." In re Guardianship of A. T.I.G., 2012 UT 88,

iJ 15, 293 P.3d 276. "Under
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[a] plain error review, [the Court] 1nay reverse the lower court on an issue that
was not properly preserved if a party can show that: '(i) an error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the h·ial court; and (iii) the error is hannful[.]"
~

Id.
Here, as demonstrated above, it was error for the trial court not to

~

conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Luke
should be estopped fro1n asserting the statute of lhnitations as a defense to
foreclosure of the 2001 Trust Deed. See supra pp. 47-54. And that error was
harmful since, without it, sum1nary judgment would not have been granted
against the McMurdie parties. See In re Guardianship of A. T.I.G., 2012 UT 88, ,r 15,

~

293 P.3d 276. Thus, the first and third prongs of a plain error analysis are met.
As to whether the error should have been obvious to the trial court, '"[a]n
error is obvious only if the law governing the error was clear at the time the
alleged error was made."' Id.
(j

1 22. Here, the law governing equitable estoppel is

clear, and the McMurdie Parties even quoted to the trial court case law that
defines and explains- albeit in in the context of the discovery rule- the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. (R. 1690-91, 2603-04.) Because the McMurdie Parties made
the factual argument for equitable estoppel and cited case law from which the
doctrine could be deduced (R. 1690-95, 1952-56, 2595-2606), the error in failing to
apply that doctrine here should have been obvious to the trial court (and,
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admittedly, to counsel as well). Accordingly, if the Court does not find the
McMurdie Parties' equitable estoppel argu1nent adequately preserved under

Patterson, it should still address the argument under the plain error exception to
the preservation rule.

~

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's gr!nt of summary judgment and
hold that (1) there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the
2003 Note, the 2004 Notes, the 2011 Extension Agreements, and the 2013

Extension Agree1nents renewed or superseded the 2001 Note, and (2) if the 2001
Note was superseded and not renewed, there is a genuine dispute of 1naterial
fact regarding whether Luke is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense to foreclosure of the 2001 Trust Deed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 P~ay of May 2017.

PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC

D. Luthy
Marty E. Moore
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM

(j)
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CT244

TRUST DEED NOTE
1JJ6\
DO NOT DESTROY TI-llS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be rurre11dered to
Trustee for cancellation before reconveyance will be made.
~

''':i:::::::J"

September 24, 2001
$500.000.00
Tremonton, Utah
FOR VALUE RECENED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay of the ol'der of:

BANK OF UTAH, CUSTODIAN FOR HARRY McMURDIE mA
$500,000.00

<iJu

together with interest from date at the rate of TWELVE per cent (12.00%)
per annwn on the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

$S,000.O0 principal and interest payment due on or before October 24, 2001,
aod $5,000.00 due on or before the 24th of each month thereafter until
March 24, 2003 when the entire unpaid principal and interest shall be due and payable.
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any sucb
installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of 12 per cent (12.00) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereo~ or iu the performance
of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this Note, the bolder hereo~ at its option and without notice or
demand,. may delcare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default iu the payment ofprincjpal or interest, either with or without suit, the
u11dersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a teasonable attorney's
fee,
The makers, sureties, guarantors and e~dorser~ .hereof sevet~Y waiv~ presentment for payment1 demand and notice of
disho1101· and nonpayment of this note, and consent to a11y and all extensions of time, 1·enewals1 waivers or modifications
that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release
of any security, or any part thereo~ with or without substitution.
This Note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herein. All amounts due hereunder shall become immediately due
and payble upon the sale or transfer of secured property hereunder,

This Trust Deed Note fs non-assumable nnd has no 1>repayment penanty.

EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT

A
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NOTE

BEVERLY Hll.,LS DEV. CORP.
270 N C!UkOll J>r.
Beverly Hills, Ca.

Phone# l435) 257--0727
Fu# (435).257..0814

90210

EXHIBIT

I

EXHIBIT

E
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•' TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents

I

EXHIBIT

This Trust Deed, made this 24th of September, 2001
between ZANE JEPPESEN
as Trustor,
PHILLIPS-HANSEN LAND TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and

---·

.JS
'

.......... -·
,

BANK OF UTAH, CUSTODIAN FOR HARRY MCMURDIE IRA, as Beneficiary
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVE.YS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH
POWER OF SALE, the following descrjbed property, situated In the County of UTAH, Stat.a of UTAH:

See Attached Exhibit 11A11
Together with all bulldlnes, fixtures and Improvements thereon and ell water rfghts, rights of way, easemenlsi renls, Issued, proflls,
Income, tenements, heredltaments, privlfeges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said
property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER. to the r'ighta, power and suthorlty hereafter given to and conferred upon

Benetlclary to collect and apply such rents, Issued, and proms;

•

FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURITY (1) payment on the ln:lebtednass. evidenced by a promissory note of even dale h'ElreWilt\ In tha •

.

~-~~

'.!f?!i~~;~~:o~~Zo/:;;.'-~]!ltit:~i~t,it~7R~;tt~i=-~~;~r~~:~irs~:~!:~~~~~d: ·

(?):tfi_q:·,p~antqf~olt~~tµo~lJ~~a,r.,s~~~~-i1!tj:l~~,rJ!lP1.;b!)!P.'.l~~4J.Q_.Iiii~)9tt~r~lll,,~~~sors. oc j\S~lgrra, vm~n.
e~cf!l,!l~~b1p·,ptolll~'?.1Y:no~:or~~~u~c)~gJIJ~l~1!ij. J.ry?;f~}.l~g;J:>~:itil\j(P.~J¥,e.d;)l~(~}Jh!?~enl or an sums expanded
·« scly$.(cea.;~i-s.eo~,~y{id~.oqiutsu.oi1t:IO:.U1elemis'ftcte~fi,:wt,~lher.-wllb'1ol~r~t:U:i~~-~ .fte~l~ provided.
•NOTE: Trustee mue( b.e a member or the Utah State aAi::.a.tumlt, l;!U11~.loo.§.tl.d.JQ..e,o11.u.P91~Jli;,nQr.®V1rm1..Pru!...!2.~M~Ps!.~qn,
eulhor\zed to do suoh b1Jslness In Uteh; a corporallon aulhorlzed 1o do a tr\Jst business In Utah: or a tllle tnsuranoe or 'abstract
c:impany authorized to do such business In Utah,

,, .,.

~

EXHIBIT

r
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PAaiE·a;
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.

·

•

: ••:• ( ·

•·

....

'l~~)tj!a~ru.si.l?~~tl~h~U..epply lOi.lll~re;t.o_'the.henefit-ot nni! iilnd~jparlles h*~lo. ~.eJr:t.e!B; Jegatee, de11lsee, admlnfsfr2tors,

~~~. 'G~11BC~h.J)iiiit :S~slgl'!~ Ai1<1bUgatrons~fJJUSlor.l~r~u1_1tltir are Joint ~!:'lttli~~t" ·~:term ~~nellclary• shall mean the

..

~er~l!~J·l}o~t_=~~~.lld!.11!i;Drrrpled9.8$;;:ofJne nole;t1e,~d,,l;1~.rebY,~ _In this T~t:P!3.~cl, .y?f)a~~er. the context re:iurres, the mas~llne
'gen:l!!s::1!:l~~et;ilii!,ferrdnl~,.sn;l[ot.n.e,~fer, and~asln~11jrfiU1J.1b~J·fdc1ud1?s the plural.

ii!., :rrii~~~:a~1s:µ~1s.::r1t1~l1vhllnJfiWT;nrs\1)~~J.i1JJIY·J,ce~X~:~~,;r acknowledged, Is ma.de a public record as provided by law.
T,:uste~,lsrh~t.~llgB~J~1\0Wt-OJ\Y..Pai1Y..her~to ~ pen~foftial~.:w:itf!?(any other Trust Deed or of any acllorr or proceeding In which
r.tu·~,_ ~t..• ~.
,.. .ienc.::l~;r,.~~!or.:.1i···ru·~1.~:sha!fbo,s.;p~yi!,lnless...:b..,r~~g1Jl.~)'·T,!'lls,.1e.e.
"2D.,:1"Jl!t! J~~·O~clJ)li~;f?.e~~Elltucd ~~·~"8-!QJho l~·fEfgf.~,~~o of Utah. •
,.
.~~-. J.li, ~:a.~@!G.ry~~ T.;'ustc;ir :ro9~1&:that if.co~Ybf :any noliQt!.9f$.f.a.1.:1tl encl ct, any no1lce qf sale her,nmder be mallsd to him at lhe
ac!aress lierelribefore set forth. · ·
· ··
· ·
,.
·
22, This Deed ofTrustls due on sale and non-assumable.
ENT 9 79eo :eoo1 PO 3 of of

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, . , . . . , , _ , _ . . , . , , . ._ _.,.,,-..,.,...,_•

<

H

State of UTAH

)ss:
County of BOX ELDER

On 1h!s 24th of September, 2001, personally appeared before me
ZANE JEPPESENa
. . ..
the slgner(s) of the above Instrument. who duly ~C_' ·ewi~~ecJ. to met

·· ·

cutethhe
same.
·:•·: .. .. ..
~.:

·_.. _: .... _: --~ • : • -_:.

~~~~~~~~~•

~r.:.

~

~!·;~

•,N

-~ :

1

~- ...

••.•/!':•••••••.-,••, :•;:

.i~fi..~.;;:~~-·/:· :'•:·:: ·•. •, ·:.:

,..rr.,,....il"V''IIPQlii,iloil"""~i,vipip......"'-.
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£'1\licEI:. 1
. .. . ~ - -·-· .,.. . ... ----- ·- -··-····· - . --- .......... - .......
canwm:,.tng 349. 8 feat. West. nl«ig,_;.~~- ~~tiO}l ).in_~. ~ South .l7° 32,' . Bnst. 268. 05
£HT

►.;:,

~~~ ~ ~a Nort!1east., ~~_of. Seotioµ_.i~,.-=·~lµ.\?,::.4i . Sbll.~,.. inanga. 2 East,
~ t ' ~ . ~-~ ~: J~un;. -ther_ic0 ~:tIQ2~'3D :fe~t.,· :~·--c»:: .l.~l1~:to>t.he
·•·-~I>ti'o.,.'g''.{· -~,·}•_ '·~f"CB_ly;yl ·AA,:iin: ~··_ ·· •. ~--~«26m.Gd ~ i ..6.,, 1992, in
:b;6k 30~t!i.(ga/;l4!T'· :cm~'.iibl ·53201· ·,offlliial.·•z:Edoms 1., 'the.-i=e South alon9
. Eiaict .Mb~~,---·,·,;· ··."'~,.;+:i'e4'..a:o··:feeJ:•(t1iebbi1~.wiiat:.;:~92,53 feet 7 then::e North

11 :~--Jttiirejjbi·tslf~=;~,-~~1u;.'.~~~;- Qf-~.uttU,Ji~~

PAtem. .2

camen::tlng at the No:i:thwest cqmer of the Conder/Stone ~ , wbi.oh point
is ~th 85><'52'59 11 Weot along the seation line :mt.BO feet and SQuth 17°39 1 01''
Ba.st, 21$0,_0S_ 'feet .fl:all tho Northeast t1otn~.of..Sec:tioh 19r:;'IJ.'oi-1nshi9.-:4 ·.scnth.t

rittt~~~~«•t:~~~~~

;~IR~,.e
~ 1 ; ·:tf.ne• 298i2~· teet·1 ·tb~~.;•NoJ:ai.. o·~.!;SG:?sg)t- 'f.! · t:. 13~:36.· fee.t
]:q -~a;-l:i:6#.\e :of
:be;g~~: .. _... _..• • • ••• • •"' .,.,;., O.•·,~. . .
~
c

1

•.

•

'

••

I

*: ·..

••J •:.•

I

•••

,,.,• •

I ••

.'

,.:.Vt.•~.,.a. , .............. ~-..., rr,..J-. ..

.

~ .. :":'

.

•

-~!· .... ··•&

••

I

."'•~--

It al I or any pert ot i·he Proper-ty, 011 l!lfi• Interest In tt Is sold or transferred
without f38nef lot~ rv•s p-. lor •~ ltten o:,nsGnt, E!el\Elf• tctei ry mey, ut Its optton,
requlre tmmedtate p!lyment tn ful f of ~11 suns secured by this Security lnstrunei,t,
0

TOGETHER WITH: ALPINE CITY WATER POL[CY CERTIFICATES: ~l3t M24, M26t M261 M27.
M2B & M29.

;:: .:...

;:...:..· .. , .,.:.:..,, -.~.:..:..=.,...~;~ _, .................,..

·~·:--

.... _.,.,_ .... .

. ;,

~

..·.,
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3 00
~
• f

·~-

... ~~Bhc.f
dolVt~fu~~~
UTAH COUNTY RE~ORDER

ltnB~ ~~Radf~ ~~P~A7tffJYof91rrau

With Assignment of Rents
EXHIBIT

This Trust Deed, made this 24TH of SEPTEMBER, 2001
between ZANE JEPPESEN
as Trustors, · . .

PHILLIPS-HANSEN LANO TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and
BANK OF UTAH, CUSTODIAN FOR HARRY McMURDIE IRA, as Beneficiary

WITNESSETH: That Truster CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH
POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated In the County of UTAH, State of Utah:
See Attached Exhibit 'W

. :+_.?!'J_~~e:r,_witfra_u
_ J?u~(~ln~~.:~_.·xr_.~11:1.~:a. riMiii~~fr.<~~Jji_w_;_ :, Rfi and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rants, Issued, proms,
#1;,cm/3.;fa.t)~l)'l~l').~j·,h~rad!ta~'.\l!JfP.tivJleg~:~p ~ppi.li-J~r.,s.ihereunto belonglng, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with aald
·. pr~y;:ot[~fP.Eifthai'Qoff.SUB;!,~T:,;!'IP.Wsy.ER.)i1jlj13;~9.bhii power and authority heroafler given lo and conferred upon
B..~:n~t,t~;to·•~P~~~dfiw..&·~;li~J:i~~1sstledi:end;pl'Cill~~
FOR iHE PURPOSE OF' SECURl1Y (1) p\lymsnton tho lndabtedn~-s evidenced by a promissory note ofeven dale herewith, In the
principal sum of
,..

·.$5(J'OfQO.O}Q.lJ ~~:~Y. rr~tp1,rna)"#~tilliebrclsi'~Jfoij$.q~asy~l1fiit;l!m~~;·,1~mf~iffiaji~:Wllfi'.lljijf.~~lJ!(U,mlri'J~'
:~·c:l;1ti;:'a\l<f),~'ibelerisloiitfa1WT01\mhow#ta:b.r.modmc:a~nslAA[~0.n~2)tf,e,perfomt'aot:ii,·.or:eacbjgce.o.~nl.o'):ftl:isfctlii'r.elif~l~fried,·
:' 3,•tfit· ·.. ., ...e.tofsi:iclf a•ifdlltorfu[rcian1fijhia9an~ a!1 lulreaft1kma ·tfa~.10:Trusfors i.or'hls:sll~. ii-Qi"•iis;.t..;.ns ·,,..i;:ofr. . ...

~"~sif
· JiQte_:,rno~~,--lha•·lhei
·;.;..J= m:_.,·•:;.j.li,;ttr.
··..r.;.i'
.--......... -~;~p,.~ir
.... ~.IY
..... r. ..,, ........'!•!If~.. ~. ¥ai'B'~["'•t111
. . . . . 111. i 'ii'·
.. TµSi~n.eea·,
.. .,,!..:~a~,~)-B<&;
.. \. 'l'• •. P.~l-'.'!~~
..... v- .$1.lfifJ.~-:-·
penl.!'o-!,I
.:eJiitan£,m;:n.,
:oi~e1ft;ir.i~i!Y~Piili.fiWjiY.':~.a~~ipJ!rl~l:J9.·~,,.;~~-~,,~-"1Qf:.t~e1hel"wilh:tnteresl~reon·;as.fair.elfi·pto~~a.·
0

..NOTE: Trustee musl be a member of the Utah stat~ Bar. a banK bLJlldlng and loan eeso()Jsllon or sav[ngs anti loan association
authorized to do such business In Utah: a corporalkln authorized to do a trust business In U\ahi or a title Insurance or abstract
company authorlzed to do such business In Ulsh, _ •
TO PROTECTTHe SECURITY OPTHJS T.R!J~T DEl;D,, THE '!R!JSTQ~ A.~RS:ES:

.

• • . · •

• •

·

=11.• ·,o~e:e.1r~IP!.OP.~rlit'lil_.~ol)'d:con,dl~Qli)mdte11l!tr.:nol.lo.rem'CM!~D(:¢.eii10llshiiri>~uWng lher¢~~-~~«Jifi'nliH~:of're$t6jo:P,fj.;1T1P.·t1y

;a.~~-tri'.1Q~'.)v~mm~llf.~/m:~~~Y-'.~µU_9.1ns11Auefti rnai®,~n~inJ.Q,1&~,~w.ij~<!faestf.9t~)~~r~~9:19;tim;,1y;,Y.!Uii!U~v~i· ····
:®'{&iant1fiiritli.es\rliilJons'l!ffetUng·sa!d·,P.t.QPJ:\rty;-n~lJo:commltor,P,.OIJllll.wa&la.lb'ijreor;..nd.l:to'.c:Qlll#.{ill,·.§.ulrerot•~jm!tmy:act:upoi'i1

.salct.P,~e"fht~o1atkiff.tt~~1a:06,a1t~1het-.'~=w1t1c.hfrom'.ttre;ct1ataote.r~r.1i,~e·otiaJ~fP.fo;i«r1y.in1Jy,60raaii'oniibly.n~~~;;,ici
:s···ecldc'enllinenitfrdniiaterein:~t'#l(C{ufil~··:l11e~• ilnd ·.lh~~loaj\,s.hi1ufti<f :he~1f'),f ei{' .·'ai:t=t11ofdOJ,lfifefo''•Ji!)f~ti\lcn- ':thJ·..

:P~~~}r~,~j=~t~lJ:•:~~,~~iMt:i.:~,J;~~~t:~,,q;ijl~t~;~;:,;~~-~~;~~·~nd
)c_
n'~ij~ta.·. i:li::i.mt_o_·.~.(le_.nf~i.~D4(b)_J9_.a_JJO'.ii8~{1.l§!fml~!.1>."Jg1P.e_
)'rQP.~fJS'_
Om~~-.d. Ut'lf).8 ~~rq. l.otu
=W..

:9f'~
.. - .

i~.~--.~!l.

~l:@11

1i_rt\slee,

pt.

:iiP.~:P~~~Uoll:t;>·tt::of:no;afti:4?.vlt~e~l>V-:~on~e1aiy.- ~-~~¥j,~l!l!.n:~1a:im~wfrto,a·ije{aul1J?Y. ·r.,~t¢uMerJti~f.iiJ~~

.

:~~~pll~ 1~~1h~~~~~;~:lt1:(e-~r.ict~~lw!'.~11 tat:ls.·a~ $.™~m~nU!l8~~(ni•-~!'.\(1~~c~l)t·:~Jlll,~~:~#:'CQ~.clµ_~!~~pll feels

t~i:;,;;:-:ir~t;~i:;ari~~tJ'ciu=.:fr!Y#~.~n·~~friJ~tfae

Beneficiary rnay reqUlre: on the.Improvements now

:e~U/1Q,!}rlµt~~rore~;!)t:~?.C~.o~!}!t_a1dipr~~~r1V•.Jqtm:,J~.~9~~-~~~II .~~- car_rj~d I~ .~i:r1~~nle~ a_i:,prt>VEld by Beneficiary Wllh

.fc>;~AAY.4b1~:~s·esJTTf1:l~.()f E!?ld]n(0~111/~C~pl,i,t.~,~~~~-n,~RQJ.11q.; JllJt~nf9.!W$~t[r~Jor-$1,µllEttl.VG:J~medlale nol!Qe lo
:~i~.~~"wtto=may~~:proof.aU011J,.a9.~:e!l(:bJ~~~i~9..~P.~~~.~ce:rn~i;r:t~~i~~.~!~~-:~n.ftdlrected lo make payment
·.fot'ptieh~o-~·:~~~Oy, ~~~-e"~(n_~pf{o..;'.!°t;t!!ilor.~IJ.9,:~~h.~tt~~l~~!IYi~.~-:t~i~~~;Pf~,9~~;1or any pert thereof, may
l;ie·'a})p!l~d<by B.enefic!ary,:caUts ·Oj)Uon,,to:f.G.d.U(:IIQ.n ~f'th_o b:,.~~~.l~~n.~~;~reby;s.~i;~ '9~Q .Jh!i!f®loi'j.lll,On qf repair of the property
damaged, ... . · .
··
.
. .
· .. · .. · ·· · · · ·

1;3en~(Tclary

lncludlng

supplements

3, To deliver ID, pay for and maintain with Beneriolary untll the Indebtedness scoured hereby 111 paid ln full, such evidence or title as
may require,
abstracts of \IUe 9r policies of tllle Insurance atid eny extensions or renewals thereor or

·11rrJ~P.P!!ar'tn.~~mi:,&{eri(fany aofion or°proceedlng purporting lo afrectlht;~e'oµijty:hef.4~,.:~e·lfli~~l&:otlltJ properly,-or ih'e rlghtsor'

P.~\'if~ o.f battefl~~!.Y:.~:J~Eilae; and should 8eneflclaiy or Trustee elect to also_:~P.P-~-~r•fn~l'.~et~;l:11)Y,Such ecUorr or proceedlng1 to

':payall.,~sls:anch»q,enses,.lncludlng cost of evidence of Ulla and attorney's fees t_n _E.(;~so_h_~bl_8~U,W)rt~rred by Beneflp!ary or . ·

;~u~~a:~;

at ~eastto:dB,y.Sbefota,d~Jfoguency_:itl''tt!~eii and assese.ments ancl ehargosforwatir, appu~~nanl to'or"uRsd In connecllori"
with said properLYi~l9p_ay.iwh~iii.lti~,.¢l}a.'.~mbriJ;11~~-. chprges, and liens wlth Interest, on
property or any part 1hereof1 whloh al
any Ume appear too·o=•Pl1cir-or!iuperlor:h~r'9JQj l~.P»Y:~ costs, fees1 and e>:pens&s of this Trust.

said
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~ ______

~ ~ - • ,.._.

Slate of UTAH

)ss:
County of BOX ELDER
On this 24TH of SEPTEMBER, 2001, personally appeared before

ZANE JEPPESEN,
the signer{s) of the above Instrument, who dul :· · ·· · · ··· ·
.

.;

·

me
--

same.

..·

'---,..;.;-a.-r-:.-:._

·~. "'\'·

--~ ..

~
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·i;~~~·J1~-M~'.~~)~~\:~f~$.t::'3ttjng·1h.~{~~~-~~:Lln,,~iio:·~ou~h:_floa2'.~~-t-~oa~~sJeei-fit>m··
u;e·Noitliaasr,Cot'fler·or S.e.c'UQn igi:,T.owns.1:ilpA.~~ql4\h:1::8',111g~Z::t~~~1:,:~a~ l~K~;~?.,.e::~n~.
~a#i~n:; _t~~~r.~e;'.;~# ?~~~~,~,f~~km9~-~r}~~sJfl~•.Mc!;>~n1~, :~i¾>par.tt~~. i;1~§.~tiba.dJ~.-ijtf •
instn11xi~Pk~f~r.d.~~:;Q~i96~r,'~~J~~-it,Jn.~99)5;~P:1~t"~t-.P,~g~,i,~,...~~}~9.~:~~~~1:,1:P.ffl~~
1'.t\l~<ls.;_tli~t1-~1~~~,thiato.~(lL$~l~t:,MoRi¥1)~1;-P.!~P;-~rt.t-2,_~@~,q·:r~,t,,1Jia..1'.\~.l;\¾f~!:lt~e:a~~-@,e.t.,
·tt1~~?: ~?t•i\t i.71~'.·,W~l_:2~~~J:ne~t lp :t!°'13J'.{a~·of~beQlnntnµ.
,.
PARCEL 2:

Commenolng at the Northwest Corner of the Condor/Stone prcperty, which point \s South 89°
52'59'1 West along the St!Otlon Una 349,80 feet and sou'lh 17°39'0'ln l:ast 268.05 feet from the
Northeast Comer of Section 19, Township 4 South, Range 2 Ei!lst, Sall Lake Basa end
Meridian: lhanoe S0UU1 17°39'01n cast along th9 Westerly llrie of the bonder/Stone property
298,25 faer. lhnce South 89°62'58" West 13,36 feet: thence North 17°39'01" West parallel to the
Condar/Stone property line 298.25 feet: thence NorU, 89°56'59 East 13.36 reet to ihe point of
beglnntng. ,,
If all or any part of the property or any Interest In It Is sold or transferred without Beneficiary's
prlor written consar1t1 13eneficla1y mEly, st Its option, require Immediate p~iyment In full of all
sums seourad by U1f.s Securltt lnslrt1ment.
Together with: Alpine City Water r.iollcy Car.tlflcatl:>S: M23,.M2.4, M25, M26, M27, M28 and M29.
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NOTE:# 01•310

BEVERLY BILLS DEV. CORP.
270 N Canon Dr.
~verly B"dls1 Ca.

Phone N(435) 'l57-07l1
Fu# (435) i57.0824

!>02iO

· .... ,---···-•-·••·---... 4.--~-M--·••··-•-.",.·:--.---·-···~ ·

PAOPBB.TY ADDBEss·- · . . ·.·-------·.·.·.·.· ·.. ~-,.···

·

l. BORROWER~SPROMISE TO PAY
'
In retw'l\ for the loan that I have received, BBDC promise to pa.y U.S. $ SOO 000.00
(this amount is called principal) plus
interest, to the order of the lcudtr, Tho lciidcr ls Hmy L Apd/pr Shira H McMmdte (primary) Hmy and Sbi:rn Mc.Mmdit Fmnily Trust
{secondary)
• BHDC uuderstand$ that the lendet' lll4Y tnmsfer this nots. The Lmler er any ono who takes this cote by
trQafer ®d who l!I entitled to ,-ecclvo payments lJllder thia Note ls called the Not.e Holder.

2.INTEREST

lnrore$t wUl be charge QD 1mpaid principal until the fbU emouot ofprincipal has been paid. BHDC will pal. in~t at a yetuiy tatij of
~-,~ded--.. ,9soo. · · ·r,%.
'tho m(e(ffl rate roqulred is tho nto !\WC wU1 pay both bo!'ote lllld after any default ~oribed 1n Section 6(B) of this Note.
3.PAYMENTS
(A) Tim~ and Place of Pa.yments
BUPC ,vW pay !oterest by CQmpounded. pay.ments e.mmally•
.BHDC will c:ompoudd IDDlually payments on thei-2.4SJL_ day each month beg:lmg ott ,April
:20..L,.. BHDC wilt umk~ thc.1e
paymart, tvrqmontb until aD of the prlnoipal and mtercst end any other charges deseribed below tlmt niay 'be owed undt;r this Note,
Monthly payments will be applitd to interest before principal If 011 it Mm:@ 2004
BHDC sdll owe amounts under tl1i$ Note,
BHOC wUI pay those am.ouuts ln tun on tlw: date, which is oalled tm matnritv chtta. BHDC will tnako paytncnta at d3Q North Tremont
Street
1

or

.-l,remontona-Ut&4aJz.,. , , ... _

7 , ......

--~r~:mounf<itMolrthlfia~ts·· ·. · ···.

oratadlifcnmtplaccifrcquiredbytheNoteHolder.

12 Month paYD'iC!ltwill be In tM mnonnt oru.s. s 540 000.00 •
4. BORROWER"SRIGHT TO PREPAY
BHDC have the right to make payments ofprlnoipal at U1f time before they are due.
BHDC may .makr.s a full prepayment or pllltinl payments without pllying mJY prcpl}'lUetit charg,, Thij Noto Holder will mo all orBHDC
J)rei,ayments to reduce the amount of prlncfpal that Is owed under this note, If BHDC mal<es apfflfal prepayment, thero will be no changes In
tho dUQ date or iu the amount or my montbly pay.meat mdcss the Note Hold« n,Smcs mwrlt.mg to th~ changes.
5. LOAN CHARGES
If AIAw, which applies to thJs Jam mid which 5Cbs maximum lean Q]im:ps1 is finally i n ~ so that th; in~r;:it or other Joan ¢bargca
collected or to be collt.ct.ed In connection with this loan exceed the pemrltmd limJt!. then: (i) any such loan charge shall be, mkiced by the amount
necessary to ted\108 tho wt"SB to the pe:mitted ll.mi~ erid (ll) 4oy sums already coJleoted from ms whlob ~ pemrllt-ed JfmitB w:ill be n.fund~
to BHDC. Tho Note Holclcr my oh00sc to make dus J'l;fimd. by reducio,a the principal BHDC owes Ul1d~ this Noto or by roeldug thfs p~ent to
BHDC. If p refbnd ~ pmicfp,il. the rednctioD. will be Created a.s apartial prep~yn:ient.
6. lJOlUtOWER'S FAlliORE TO PAY AS .REQUlBEl>
(A) Late Chtrg~ for Overdue Pupnents
It the Note Holder has not reoelved the t\lll amOW1t of monthiy payments by ?be cud ot &iffeeQ ca!ettdar days a11.et' ihe date fl is due,
BHDC will pay II Jete dlarse to the Note Holder. Tlie l!DlOUDt of the c:barge will be s.ooo % of ovmdue payment o!pnncipal aud i.nttrest.
BHDC will pay this Jate charge promptly btil otify 0l?C8 on eaoh lale payment
(B) Default
IfBHDC does not pay tho full amouut ot c.achmant.hly payment on th0 de.to it is due, BHDC will~ in default.
( C) Notfco of Dttalllt
li'BHPC ts in default, the Note Holder may send a written notice ielling l3HDC that ifyou do oot pay the over due amount by a ceibiin date,
tho Note Haldg-umy R<'{t1i.a, to be paid immediately the .full amount ofprlnoipal which has not bei,n paid and all t.ln1 Int.crest that BHDC owes on
that wo\UU. Thai date mu.st be at least 30 dal"S afb=' the date on which fbo notice1 is deliver or mailed to BHDC.

EXHlBIT

MTJJ,,11ST.-\T'U'.t'"ED"ATt NOTE

EXHIBIT

j

C

: I .,_6.JJ .
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ti\J.HN ZANE JEPPESEN

NOTEi.# 01-310

111 West Main

Tremonto11t Ut.

Phone# (435) 257-0727

84337

Fax# (435) 257-0824

Gi)

MUL'OSTATE PilOtD RATR NOTE:

EXHIBIT
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EXHIBIT
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l.

Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. If all or any part
of th~ Property or any interes~.in it_~ sold or tr~ed (or i£ a beneficial ~est in

Sit~1E~iiii~

Lender if exercise is proiuoned by federal_ la:w..~. 0£ tho date of this S ~ ~
IfLcmdcr exercise this option. Leo.llii.stuillsfve'..Boi.TO\V.~~ptj'¢;~·~~~
The notice shall provide a period o£not lesii"tliaroSt)::Q~$~~i»t¥.:4~~~e;iwtir.e-;~'4,~iereil
or mailed within which Boaower nm.st p~_@_:~,ii~H~·.\?Y,-#iifS~ liistrmj1e1It.,Jt.
Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to'.'lJm·c;~~mi"ririlils;peiiod;.~ii~r-$.(l}'~yg~,
nnyremodies permitted by tms Security-InsfrwnentwithQ~Met~¢.i~_~r-:09~dT~Bortower.

l!.ied

\V

•:\1

~~,~~
.

MUL'lmA'l'.I!: FIXED RATit NOTE

i

f
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JOHN ZANE JEPPESEN
111 West:M'ain

Phone# (43S) 257..0727

Tremonton, Ut.
. 84337

Fa# (435) 257-0824

.1.4 .MARCH

,-:!;·

2004

·_::~:-;. ·::·... ~·.--:-~·:~.

UTAH

ST::04

Com:•w·U9;8].?4"'gts·v,1foe·32':W2t,S:,OS~T-•FRNJ!''CORS~~:1:9_:.t4s:R2ESU\d::Jl·7g1~~8·RT:.W'692.:53'(FtfN·~175J~C
:ties. 4;82Aori!s-:· .· . . Fefereric(dU3A049 . :8enali# l i:a4gibOO, · . District-if 040 . . ·- .

. 32' w-~98~25 Fr' To Beg.· . .. .

. .

-·-• ..... , ..

..

. ·······-·

PROPERTY ADDRESS

,_ .. -

~m~~~~~~~~~-l~ms.¢f<?:P.~Y.,1t$,~J.$:Mthi7i.i1 .. {t¥.s tm1ount1!talliil:prm.OJPal}'pl\1S:iiueTestw.: .
.•~~id~bf-tho:1cn;d~;~Wh~J~·~-Hmrvl_-MoMntdie~andior Shira Mc'MurdiCJ-'{nrim~:.V)~ ful'd:Sliirii'Mc'Kfutdie:FaIDiiy·T:mst(seeondary}
: .· - . .- .. ······. ... .... ... . .. ... .. .-~ti.ulacrstfutd$':tliat~ilie_-.···foodei:;:n~1rm1srcrttiis.n.ot~ ·'l"h~tend~t:br:anu:encwntiinkcsth.is:note1u..~sfbr
atid who is"entitled fo receive payments"under i61s'Note 1s·-~;.uea ~N~te Holder. .
. .. . . . ,. , ~~- ., ......... •,·, •, .. ,-·. • . . . iq:· . ' . ,
l,INT.EREST
Interest will be charge on unpaid pr.incipal UD1il ~ full amount of principal has been paid. I will pay interest at nyearly rate of
Compounded 16.000...,.._%.
The interest rate reqtureius::the:J will pay both before and after any default described in Section 6(B) of this Note.
3.PAYMENTS ·•
(A) Time .and Place of Payments
I will pay interest by COinpounded payments ~ .
I will compounded annually payments on 1M :~Uri , day of each month beginning on April
20_M:,_. I will make these payments
tt:Very month umil all of the principal and interest and any other charges described below that mey be owed under this Note. Monthly payments
Ube 8:IJplied to mterest before prin0ipat If on 24 March 2005
J~11 owe amounts under this Now, I will pay those ~aunts in full on
i.aat date, which is called the maturity date. I will make payments at· 4M:Nhrt:1fTremont{{ft-eet . 1'remon1on. Ut. 84337
or
at a diffetmt place if required byihe Note Holder.
~ ·,..1 _ /
--:, ~
(B) .Amount of Monthly Payments
-~
d ~

+-

12Monthpaym~willbemtheamountofU.S,$232.314.49 . ·
~i~ {r-Gvl.-L ' ( \ ~ -;ti. BL""' ?JD
4. BORROWERS RIGHT TO PB.EPAY
Lv t'\· c.' ~~'I have the right to make payments ofprincipal at any time before they ara due.
"' ~~ ~.)
I 1llllY make a full prepayment or partial payments without paying any prepayment charge. The Note Holder will use all ofmy prepayments to
reduce the amount of principal that is owed under this note, If I makes a partial prepayment, there will be no changes in the due date or in the
amount of my monthly payment unless the Not.e Holder agrees in writing to those changes.
5. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED
(A) Late Chargefor Overdue Payments
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of mon!hly payments by the end of Fifteen calendar days after the date it is due, I will

•.

pay a late charge to th~ Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be 5.000 % of oYerdue payment of principal and interest I will pay tlris
late charge promptly J,);$ollly,_~;on e~ I~ ~!lt
(B) Default

,.,-.....
If I do not pay the full amount of eachm.ontbly payment on the date it is due, I will be in default,
( C) Notice ofDefault
If I mn in default, the Note Holder may send a written notice telling me that if you do not pay the ov& due amount by a certain date, the Note
Holder may require to be paid immediately the full amount of principal which has not lY'..e11 paid and all too interest that I owes on that amount.
That date must be at least 30 days after the date on vmic:11 the notice is deliver or mailed to me.
{D) No Waivei· By Note.Holder
.
Even if, at a row, when. I is in default:, the Note Holder does not require m.e to pay immediatelyjn,_:fbll es described above; the Note Holdor will
still have the right to do so if I am in default at a later time.
(E) Payment of Lender Coi;ts and Expenses
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as descn'bed above, the Note Holder will have the right to be paid baclc.by me for
all of mcosts and expenses in enforcing this Note to the exte.nt not prohibited by applicable, law. Those ~-penses include, for example,
'
reasonable attorney's fee.

EXHIBIT
MULTISI'All mED RATE.Non

. . . /.8 .

(ot, ~

-f-rc,W\ '1'~ ~ ~~,,,ce
EXHIBIT

.F
.. ,
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LOAN MODIFICA'['!ON, EXTENSION AND
CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT .
11il.S LOAN MODJFlCATION, EXTENS10N AN)) CHANu""'E lN TERMS
AGREEMENT (the "Modif~:ation Agreemmrend',) is made and entered in10:. on the date set forth
below, by and bchveen HARRY I. McMURDIE and SHIRA McMURDIE both individuaJly and
as TRUSTEES OF THE HARRY AND SHTRA McMURDIE!i'AMILYTRUST (collectively the
,cMcMm·die~,_~,, a~d JOHN ZANE JEPPESEN ("Jepp,esen11).

WI1'NESSE1"B
WHEREAS~ on 01· abo.ut September 241 200 l , Jeppesen executed and delivered to the
Bank of Utah a certain Trust Deed Note in the am.aunt of Five Hundred Thousand and No/I 00
Do11ars ($500,000.00) (the '1001 Note''); and
WHEREAS~. the, 2001 Note was secured by a Deed of Trust (the "First 2@01 Trust
Deed'i against certain real pro1,erty located in Utah Counly,. State of Ul!lh, identified by La11d
Tax Serial Nos. 11:049:000Tand 11:049:0035 (the "SeeMn·cd Property"); and

WHEREAS, the First 200 J Deed of Trust was recorded wi Lh the Utah County Recorder
on-Sepfembcr-26~2oot 11s Bnti:y No.-97920:2001 ;" a.nu --· · · - -· - - - · - · - --- - - - - - - - · - -- WHERHA.8, Jeppesen. eithei; thr0\1gh inadvertence or oversight, exec1.ited and deJjvered
lo the Bank of Utah a Second Deed of Trust (tl1e "Sefonul 2001 Trust ]I)e(Nr'') which also

secured the 2001 Note; and
WHEREAS, the Second 2001 Deed of Trust was foadvertently recorded with the Utah
County Recorder on October 4~ 200 t. as Entry No. 10J 183-:2001 ; and

WHEREAS~ on or about March 24, 2004~ the 2001 Note was replaced and superseded by
two Promissory Notes (the ' 20041 Notes~t) designating the McMurdies us lende-rs and holders of
the 2004 Notes; and
4

WHEREASj the- pritwjpal babu1cc owing under the 2004 Notes was i.11ru·ee.sed to Seven
Hundred Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-one and• I Vl00 D<>llars ($7001271.11) altho1.1gh no
additional funds were actually loa.i1ed from the McMtu·dies to Jeppesen; and
WHEREAS, Jeppesen filed a Petition fo-1· Bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United
States Bap.krupt.cy Code on or about the 14th day of September 2005 in tbe United States
Bankmptcy Court for the District of Utah~ as Case No. 05..34247 (the "Je-p1>ese111 tila.nk.l-uptcy~~);

a11d

EXHIBIT.
Loan Modification, Extension and Change it\ Terms Agreement

,ut1s-l614-5417,v. 3

. ._ _ _ _ _ _. , ,

EXHIBIT
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t·i.

WHEREA8~ the First 2001 Trust Deed and the Second 2001 Trust Deed remain liens of
record against the Secured Property; and
WHEREAS. the parties hel'eto desire to enter into this Modification Agreement for the
purpose o t modifying, extending and clrangi.ng the terms of the 2004 Notes and memorializing
the terms by which the Pfrst 2001 Tmst Deed nnd the Second 2001 Trust Deed will be released;
NOW THEREFORE> in consideration of the premises alld the mutual covenants attd
agreem~nt set forth below, it is agreed as follows:

AGREEMENT
1.
Inco13,oration. The pa11ies acknowledge the trutlt and accuracy of the above
recitals whlct..1. are hereby illcorpora.ted herein~
2..
Principal Balance of Loan. Notwithstanding the 2004 Notes~ it is inutually agreed
and acknowledged that the loan terms are modified io reflect a principal balance ofFjve Hundrt'..d
Sixty TI1qusaud and No/I 00 DoJJars ($560~000,00) as of the date of this- Modiflcaiion Agreement
together with. accum1.1latod iu.terest on that principal bnla1:tce from Match 24, 2004.
·

3.
Extensi011 of..A,faturity Date. The maturity date of the 2004 Not-es [as modified to
rctleci the current principal bala.11:0e and upo11 which all accrued and unpaid i11terest shall be dut]
is .hereby
March
2013.
. . . -established
. - . . - .. . as. :-::*-'
•~ .. _.~f,. ··r··
··:~:.. .. .... . - . - . . . . - . .
. -.
-. - . .- . - - - - - - - . -

(@)

..1

I

- - -

4,
Nonrecourse. ff an event of default occurs Ullder the 1erms of the 2004 Notes ot·
thts Modification _Agreemen4 the McMurdics• teCO.\tfSe shall be solely agaiu.i;t 1he Secured
Property and not ngainst Jeppcse11 personally. Specifically., it is undef:~1ood b~tween the parties
that in the event· of a default, the sole recourse of the McMwllies is a non-judicial foreclosure
against tho Secured Property pursuant t() Title 57t Chapter 1t Utah Code Ann., with no
subsequent right thereunder to pursue a deficiency claim. agaiL1st Jeppesen or his heirs,
successors, assigns a.11d representatives.

-~--·~·--·· s:-- -~-Releaseo f Claims bYJeppesen~-1n con.sidera1fon-of-the-loai1 01odificatio11-herein:·---- ·

-

-- -

_ _ .!_•~---------

set forth, which the paL'ties agree is good and sufficient consideration, and as an inducement to
the McMurdies to e11te1" illto this Modirz.cation, the parties do hereby forcve1· release and
discharge the other and their officers, directorst employees, attoi:neys, sharehold.ers.1 succcsso1·s
and assigns.for and from any clabns, causes of aotion in law or equity,. demands, debtss duties,
obligationst payments, damages. breaches of contract, liabilities, suits, actions, J_osse~-; cost'{,
expenses, defuults of any legal duty or obligation or- any other claim of'any nature whatsoever,

kt1ow11 or unknown, ftxe<l 01· contingent, which any prtrty now has or may h~reinafter have by
reason of any 1natter excepting as to those specific ~ights conferred by this Modificfttion
Agreement.
6.
Effoct of Modification. To the extent any terms or conditions iu any of the earlier
documents so reforciioed ln this Modification Agreement shall co11tradict or. be in ~~011flict with
any terms or conditions of this Modification Ag1:eeme11t, such terms and co11ditions in tl1c earlier

Loan Modftlcatfon,. Extension and Chango, in Torins Agreement
482S.. 1614.5411. v. 3
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1

doc1.11nents are hereby deemed modified ru.1d amended accordingly to refiect the terms and
c<>nditlous of this Modificatlon Agreement wiili.out the necessity of' any further act or instrument.
All such amendments t11ereto shall become effective as of the date hereof.
7.
!d,1,µnterparts. This Modification.Agreement may be ex:ccutcd in any 11umbcr c>f
counterparts and by different parties hereto on separate counterparts each of which when so.
executed and delivered shall be an original but all such counterparts shatf together constitute one
attd tb.e same instrume11t.
&,
No Reaffin11.ation. By enteting into this Modification Agreement:. Jeppcsen does
not reaffirm tlu¼ 2004 Notes or other debt., if any, owit1g tbe McMurdies that may pre.date the
Jeppesen Bankruptcy, said debts having been discharged by the Jeppesen Bankruptcy.
Notwhhstandit,g, tbc parties nmtu.ally stipulate that upon tlle tender of the consideration set forth
]1erein. 011 or before March 2.4,. 201.3.., the McMurdies shall cause to be prepared and .recorded
Deeds of Reconveyance ·thereby conveying all of the M.cMurdies' and/or Bunk of Utah,s right,
fjlle and iutere..c;t h1 and to 1he Secured Property to Jeppesen, bis heirs, successors~ nssigJls nn.d
r~presentatives.

9.
ln<lmnnification, Representations and Warranties. The McMurdics ackt1owledge
that the beneficiary under both the First 200 l Trust Deed attd the Second 2001 Trust Deed is the
Bnnk of Utah acting solely in its capacity as Custodian of 1he McMurdie IRA. ·n10 McMurdies
represent and warrant that they have the authority to instrltct the Bank of Utah to assi.g11 the Bank
of Utah's interests under both Trust DeedB to the McMurdies or to otherwt-se instruct the Bank of
Ulah. to execute :Deeds ·of ileconve~1
to .Jeppesen- thereof releasi11g -thi ·srutk- or l.fttln1
securnd position in the Secured Property. As a corollary to the warranties and reprcsentatio11s set
forth in this section, the McMurcHes agree to provide Jeppcscu. with satisfactory evidence of the
assig,.mients from the Bank of Utah to the McMutdj_es or to otherwise pt·ovide Jeppesen with
Deeds of Reconveyance h1 fom1 and su.bsta11ce satisfactory to Jeppesen prior to tbe· paymc11t of
any sums to the McMurdics pursuant to this Modification Agreement

l!
!-t

s------

ancc

:,
·i
I

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, thi.s Modification Agreemcn.l is exect1ted as set forth below.
I

.!

I

I

.!I

DATED th.is "J,":l.. day of March, 2011

H
DATED this .l ~ day of March. 201 l

.-~;~.1uir

;RDiE ·;15~{~ ·
1

v~.:+,._.,•.-,i:::-:.: _. : ,

>.~--.

.iA.~ ~ : ' .......

. ~,·F.,-6'·
.

J,oan ModiticatioD~ Ext<msion and Clmng-o in Terms Agreement
Y. 2

Page3 of 4.
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HARRY AND SHIRA McMURDfE FAMILY

TRUST
DATED this

,-;J.. day of March, 2011
~

DATED this _l)_ day of March, 2011

i)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

)
: ss.

}3!N ~ )

L?:..

On this
day of March, 2_0 l l:,, porsonally appeared befo1:e me the undersigne,L a
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah1 JOHN ZANE JEPPESEN, signer of the fot·cgoh1g
itwtrumeut, and acknowledged he executed Lhe same. Witness my hand and official seal:

N 'F:ARY PUB

Loan Modiftca.tion, ~tensiot\ and Change in Terms Agrct:mcnt

Pnge4 of4
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CONTRACT EXTENSION AGREElVIENT
I Harzyt McMurdi(randtor shlra.i{oMtltclie and Hat:ry and· Shlra Mcl\1uiuie-,
Family Trust agree to extend this contract under John Zane Jeppe·seri based all
information below.
For $100.00 per contract and for other valuable consideration I agree to extend

on tlie

these two contracts.
The intent of this contract is to continue with a extension from the last two
contracts that were dated on 24 March 2004 and were to mature 01124 1'4.arch 2005. I
Zane Jeppesen agree to continue the two contracts and the amounts and interest rates as
stated on those contracts. The new maturity of this extended contract will be due on
24 March 2013. I acknowledge that your 01iginal pri110ipal amount is $500,000.00 and
other added amounts that are shown on the previous contracts.
If an event of default occurs under the terms of the 2004 Notes or this Extension
Agreement, the McMurdies recourse shall be solely against the Secured Property and not
against Jeppesen personally. Specifically, it is understood between the parties that in the
event of a default, the sole recourse of the McMurdies is a non~judicial foreclosure
against the Secured Property pursuant to Title 57, Chapterl, (Utah Code A11n.,) with no
subsequent right thereunder to pursue a deficiency claim against Jeppesen or his heirs,
successors, assigns and representatives.
The McMut·dies acknowledge that the beneficiary under both the First 2001 Trust
Deed· and·the Second·2oorTrust Deed is the Barile ofUtah acting"solefy in its capacity as

;
c·

-· -· -----· · -· f · ·

Custodian of the Mcl\.furdie IRA The McMurdies represent and warrant that they have

:

the authority to instiuct the Bank of Utah to assign the Bank of Utah's interests under
both Trust Deeds to the McMurdies or to otherwise instruct the Bank of Utah to execute
Deeds ofReconveyance to Jeppesen thereby releasing the Bank ofUtah,s secured
position in the Secured Property only in the event that Jeppesen pays this note offi11 full.
Serial Numbers: I 1:049:0007 and 11:049:0035
Start Date of Original Contract: 24 September 200 l
Maturity Date of Contract: 24 March 2013

2.'2.. . ~ 0

.4.fl

Date

EXHIBIT

Qj
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~

LOAN MODIFICATION, EXTENSION AND
CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT

1..0\~

Dated 22 March 2011 which is.due 24 March 2013

I HARRY L. MoMURDIE and SHIRA McMURDIB both individually and as
TRUSTEES of the HARRY AND SHIRA McMURDIB FAMILY TRUST agree to extend this
contract under JOHN ZANE JEPPESEN based on all the information below.
~

The intent of this con1ract is for a Loan Modification, Extension And Change In Terms
Agreement, a $100.00 extension fee and other valuable considerations, you agree to continue this
contract for 3 Months.

Serial Numbers 11 :049:0007 and 11 :049:0035

Start Date of Original Contract:... 24.~Sepiember:2001.,
.. .
. . .. . . . ..
..
. .. .
,

Maturity Date of Contract:. 24

.

Jum, 201~

--

,, ~

.. : ...... .

Date

:J;? IJ\A.cef'c}\_ tJ

HARRY AND SIDRA Mc:tvruRDIE FAMILY TRUST

EXH(BIT . •, ..

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1340

CONTRACT EXTENSION AGREEMENT
Dated 22 March 2011 which is due 24 March 2013
I HARRY L. McMURDIB and/or SHIRA McMURDIE and HARRY AND SHlRA
McMURDIB FAMILY TRUST agree to extend this contract under JOHN ZANE JEPPESEN

based on all the information below.
The intent of this contract is for a Contract Extension Agreement, a $100,00 extension fee
and other valuable consideratio11s, you agree to continue this contract for 3 Months.

Serial Numbers 11 :049:0007 and 11 :049:0035
Start Date of Otiginal Contract: . 24 Septe!)lber 2001.
11aturlty Date of Contract: . . : :2:;.,.:.4.....Jun=e--=2.:...:01__3_ _ __

EXHIBIT

, . . e(;'f ···
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GD

RULING AND ORDER ON
CROSS MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LUKE JEPPSEN,
Plaintiff,

@)

Civil No. 150401095

vs.

BANK OF UTAH CUSTODIAN
FOR HARRY McMURDIE IRA,
@

Date: August 16, 2016
Judge Christine S. Johnson

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on multiple summary judgment motions.
(1) Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Bank of Utah, Custodian for Harry
McMurdie IRA and Third-Party Plaintiffs Harry McMurdie and Shira
McMurdie ("Bank of Utah" and the "McMurdies", or collectively, "the
McMurdie Parties") filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Regarding Securities Issues on March 24, 2016. Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant Luke P. Jeppesen ("Luke Jeppesen") filed his Opposition on April 12,
2016. Third Party Defendant John Zane Jeppesen ("Zane Jeppesen") filed no
opposition. The McMurdie Parties filed their Reply on April 21, 2016. (2) Bank
of Utah filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 25, 2016. Luke
Jeppesen filed his Opposition on April 12, 2016. Zane Jeppesen filed his
Page 1 of 22
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Opposition on April 13, 2016. Bank of Utah's Reply was received on April 21,
2016. (3) Luke Jeppesen's Motion for Summary Judgment on Quiet Title Claims
was filed on April 12, 2016. Bank of Utah's Opposition was filed on April 22,
2016. Luke Jeppesen's Reply was received on May 2, 2016. (4) Luke Jeppesen
filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims for Pattern of Unlawful
Activity and Civil Conspiracy on May 3, 2015. The McMurdie Parties filed their
Opposition on May 17, 2016. Luke Jeppesen filed his Reply on May 24, 2016.
Oral arguments were conducted on July 12, 2016. Luke Jeppesen was present
through counsel, Bryan H. Booth. The McMurdie Parties were present through
counsel Marty E. Moore. Zane Jeppesen did not appear. Having considered
the arguments presented and the submissions of the parties, and being advised
in the applicable rules and the governing law, the Court now grants in part and
denies in part, based upon the following:

BACKGROUND
The undisputed facts of this case are fully detailed in the briefing and
need not be restated at length here. In summary, the present controversy arises
from a business dispute. The McMurdies made certain investments with Zane
Jeppesen, beginning with a promissory note evidencing a $500,000.00 loan from
the McMurdie IRA, executed on September 24, 2001 (the "2001 Note"). The
2001 Note was secured by two Deeds of Trust (the "2001 Trust Deeds")
recorded against certain real property (the "Alpine Property"). Zane Jeppesen
failed to make full payments on the 2001 Note, with the last payment being
received on March 18, 2004.
The 2001 Note was part of a larger series of investments which has
elsewhere been referred to as the Beverly Hills Development Corporation
("BHDC"). Zane Jeppesen ultimately entered into a plea in abeyance
agreement where he acknowledged commission of securities fraud and related
felonies in conjunction with his involvements with BHDC investments. The
McMurdies contend that, due to continual assurances from Zane Jeppesen that
he would repay his debt, and due to the 2001 Trust Deeds which were believed
to secure the investment, they did not suspect that they were victims of
securities fraud until years later.

On March 24, 2004, Zane Jeppesen executed two additional promissory
notes (the "2004 Notes"). The 2004 Notes purport to supercede the 2001 Note.
Page 2 of 22
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The first note had a repayment amount of $500,000.00 and represented the
principal which the McMurdie IRA had loaned to Zane Jeppesen in conjunction
with the 2001 Note (the "Principal Note"). The second had a repayment
amount of $200,271.11 and was described as the interest owing from the 2001
Note (the "Interest Note"). The Interest Note compounded the interest owing
from the 2001 Note and thus increased the amount of Zane Jeppesen's initial
financial obligation. The 2004 Notes both refer to a corresponding Deed of
Trust which was to protect the McMurdie Parties from possible default;
however, no Deed of Trust or other security was ever executed in conjunction
with the 2004 Notes.
Approximately six after the execution of the 2004 Notes, on March 30,
2004, the McMurdies presented Zane Jeppesen a check for $60,000.00. At this
point, the amounts owed by Zane Jeppesen to the McMurdie Parties was the
principal and interest under the 2004 Notes, and the additional $60,000.00.
On September 24, 2005, Zane Jeppesen and his wife filed a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Petition. The McMurdies were listed as a creditor in that petition.
The McMurdies were mailed notices of bankruptcy proceedings and took no
action to challenge the discharge of Zane Jeppesen's debts. On December 14,
2005, the bankruptcy court entered a Discharge of Debtor for Zane Jeppesen
and his wife. Following the bankruptcy, on January 7, 2010, Zane Jeppesen
executed and recorded a quit-claim deed conveying his interest in the Alpine
Property to his son, Luke Jeppesen.
On March 22, 2011, Zane Jeppesen and the McMurdie Parties executed a
loan modification agreement (the "Modification Agreement'') extending the
time in which Zane Jeppesen could pay on the 2004 Notes. The Modification
Agreement provides as follows:
[T]he parties do hereby forever release and discharge the other from
any claims, causes of action in law or equity, demands, debts, duties,
obligations, payments, damages, breaches of contract, liabilities, suits,
actions, losses, costs, expenses, defaults of any legal duty or obligation
or any other claim of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, fixed
or contingent, which any party now has or may hereinafter have by
reason of any matter excepting as to those specific rights conferred by
this Modification Agreement.
Page 3 of 22
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The Modification Agreement specified that it was not a reaffirmation of
"the 2004 Notes or other debt, if any, owing the McMurdies that may predated
the Jeppesen Bankruptcy, said debts having been discharged by the Jeppesen
Bankruptcy."
On December 3, 2014, the successor trustee under the McMurdie IRA
recorded a Notice of Default seeking to foreclose on the Alpine Property which
secured the 2001 Trust Deeds. On April· 8, 2015, Luke Jeppesen filed a Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Petition. Luke Jeppesen acknowledged that, at the suggestion of
his father, he filed the petition in order to delay the trustee's sale. The petition
was ultimately dismissed and a trustee's sale went forward on July 23, 2015. A
Trustee's Deed conveying the Alpine Property to the McMurdie IRA was
recorded on July 28, 2015.
Believing that the trustees sale was conducted in violation of law, Luke
Jeppesen filed the present complaint on September 15, 2015, seeking that title to
the Alpine Property be quieted in his favor. Luke Jeppesen also seeks statutory
damages for failure to release a security. The McMurdie Parties filed a
counterclaim on September 23, 2015, bringing claims of pattern of unlawful
activity/racketerring and civil conspiracy as well as their own claim to quiet title
to the Alpine Property. Both parties now seek summary judgment.
DISPUTED ISSUES

1.
The parties dispute whether there were one or two notes associated with
the 2001 Trust Deeds. Luke Jeppesen asserts there was only one, while the
McMurdie Parties believe there were two. This dispute does not go to a
material issue.
2.
The parties dispute whether the $60,000.00 the McMurdies loaned to
Zane Jeppesen in March of 2004 was related to the 2004 Notes. The McMurdie
Parties assert that these funds were part of the same investment and should be
considered a single security. Luke Jeppesen contends that Zane Jeppesen
signed no note memorializing the $60,000.00 debt, and it should be viewed as a
separate and unrelated obligation. Nevertheless, the parties agree that Zane
Jeppesen was obligated to repay the amount of the 2004 Notes in addition to the
$60,000.00. The issue of whether the $60,000.00 is a separate investment is
reserved for trial.
Page 4 of 22
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3.
The parties dispute the legal effect of the Modification Agreement. Zane
Jeppesen asserts that he understood that the Modification provided him
additional time in which to pay the amounts owing under the 2004 Notes,
although the language of the Modification Agreement states that it is not a
reaffirmation of the 2004 Notes, that obligation having been discharged through
bankruptcy. The McMurdie Parties contend that the Modification Agreement is
an illegal contract which is unenforceable. The enforceablility of the
Modification Agreement is a legal issue rather than a factual one.
4.
The parties dispute whether Luke Jeppesen was involved in Zane
Jeppesen's securities scheme, and whether the McMurdie Parties have
described a pattern of conduct which may be construed as a pattern of unlawful
activity. All factual disputes are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the Court limits its analysis to the legal issue presented.

ANALYSIS
The Court is presented with four motions for summary judgment: (1) the
McMurdie Parties Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Securities
Issues; (2) Luke Jeppesen's Motion for Summary Judgment on Quiet Title
Claims; (3) Bank of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment against Luke
Jeppesen and Summary Judgment in Favor of Bank of Utah; and (4) Luke
Jeppesen's Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims for Pattern of Unlawful
Activity and Civil Conspiracy. Following the securities issue motion, the
second and third motions are cross-motions regarding the quiet title claim and
will be addressed together, concluding with the remaining motion.

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The standard for summary judgment, set forth in Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, states that a moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter if law if that party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact[.]" URCP 56(a). The moving party must support a motion for
summary judgment with "a statement of material facts claimed not to be
genuinely disputed." URCP 56(a)(1). Such assertions must be supported by
"citing to particular parts of materials in the record[.]" URCP 56(c)(l)(A).
Should the non-moving party fail to controvert those facts, they are "deemed
admitted for the purposes of the motion." URCP 56(a)(4). Any doubts with
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regard to factual questions "should be resolved in favor of the opposing party
[and] the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
Nevertheless, the existence of some factual issues does not preclude summary
judgement. "[W]here the evidence is free from doubt so that all reasonable
[persons] would come to the same conclusion, summary disposition is
appropriate." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets., 918 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah
1996)(intemal quotations and citation omitted). Without a genuine issue of
material fact, "the Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the
applicable law, the moving party is entitled to judgment." Busch Corp. v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).

II.

McMURDIE PARTIES' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT REGARDING SECURITIES ISSUES

The McMurdie Parties assert that the 2001 Note and the 2004 Notes are
securities within the meaning of Utah law, and that Zane Jeppesen committed
securities violations when he sold these promissory note securities. In
particular, the McMurdie Parties specify that they are seeking summary
judgment as to four issues: (1) the $560,000.00 Zane Jeppesen received from the
McMurdie Parties constitutes a security; (2) Zane Jeppesen committed securities
fraud; (3) Zane Jeppesen was not licensed to sell securities; and (4) the securities
sold by Zane Jeppesen were not registered.
Zane Jeppesen filed no opposition to this motion. Luke Jeppesen does
not contest these issues generally, although he does dispute the amount of
money involved. Specifically, he argues that $60,000.00 of the funds advanced
to Zane Jeppesen were not included with any promissory note and should be
viewed as a separate transaction. This factual dispute is reserved for trial. That
aside, neither Luke Jeppesen nor Zane Jeppesen oppose the McMurdie Parties'
assertion that the promissory notes sold to the McMurdies by Zane Jeppesen
constitute securities which were not registered, and Zane Jeppesen was not
licensed to sell such securities. 1 Likewise, there is no opposition to the

1

While Zane Jeppesen filed no opposition to the present motion, he did file an opposition to
the McMurdie Parties' motion for summary judgment on the quiet title claim. That motion is
discussed below. To the extent Zane Jeppesen intended his opposition to be considered as
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McMurdie Parties' claim that Zane Jeppesen committed securities fraud.
Luke Jeppesen asserts that the securities violations committed by Zane
Jeppesen are not relevant because any claims arising from that conduct were
discharged pursuant to the Modification Agreement. The Modification
Agreement provides as follows:
[T]he parties do hereby forever release and discharge the other from
any claims, causes of action in law or equity, demands, debts, duties,
obligations, payments, damages, breaches of contract, liabilities, suits,
actions, losses, costs, expenses, defaults of any legal duty or obligation
or any other claim of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, fixed
or contingent, which any party now has or may hereinafter have by
reason of any matter excepting as to those specific rights conferred by
this Modification Agreement.
Based upon this agreement, Luke Jeppesen maintains that the
McMurdies released any securities claims they may have held against Zane
Jeppesen and that the evidence regarding securities violations is thus irrelevant.
The McMurdie Parties counter that the Modification Agreement, together with
all other written agreements between the parties, were executed in furtherance
of an investment scam and are illegal, unenforceable contracts.2 The Court
agrees in part.

part of the present motion, the Court observes that Zane Jeppesen takes the position that the
2001 Note was not a security because it was secured by real property, and such transactions
are exempt from securities laws. However, this argument is misplaced. Section 61-l-14(2)(e),
the section to which Zane Jeppesen cites, exempts a deed of trust from certain registration and
sales literature requirements (see 61-1-7 and 61-1-15). However, it does not exempt deeds of
trust on real property from securities law generally. Moreover, the exemption Zane Jeppesen
cites to only applies to transactions where all "evidences of indebtedness ... [are] offered and
sold as a unit." The 2001 Trust Deeds here would not come within this exemption because the
Alpine Property served as security on other transactions that were not "sold as a unit" to the
McMurdies.
2

This argument is not fully briefed as part of the Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Securities Issues, but is contained within the briefing on the quiet title claims. Because these
motions were argued contemporaneously and are interrelated, the Court will consider the
McMurdie Parties' illegal contract argument here.
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The McMurdie Parties ask the Court to apply a three-part test in order to
determine that Zane Jeppesen's investment agreements are illegal and
unenforceable: "The court must determine (1) what the terms of the contract
are; (2) what the statute prohibits; and (3) whether the statute or public policy
demands that the contract be deemed unenforceable." Peterson v. Sunrider
Corp., 2002 UT 43, <][27, 48 P.3d 918.
In the present case, neither Luke Jeppesen nor Zane Jeppesen have
contested that Zane Jeppesen committed securities fraud and sold unregistered
securities to the McMurdies. Such transactions are clearly prohibited under
Utah law. The first two elements are thereby satisfied.
With respect to the final element, precedent provides two factors for
determining whether a contract is against public policy. The first is "whether
the statute specifically declare[s] contrary contracts to be void; the second [is]
whether the contract offend[s] public policy or harm[s] the public as a whole, as
opposed to the contracting party only." Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2013 UT
App 218, <][34, 310 P.3d 1220.

Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, 175 P.3d 560 provides an example
of a contract which was voided on public policy grounds. In Rothstein, the Utah
Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history behind Utah's Inherent Risks of
Skiing Act, Utah Code §§78-27-51 to -54, and identified a legislative intent to
immunize ski resort operators from liability for the inherently dangerous
activity of skiing and thereby allow those resorts to purchase insurance at
affordable rates. The Court concluded:
By expressly designating a ski area operator's ability to acquire
insurance at reasonable rates as the sole reason for bringing the Act into
being, the Legislature authoritatively put to rest the question of
whether ski area operators are at liberty to use preinjury releases to
significantly pare back or even eliminate their need to purchase the
very liability insurance the Act was designed to make affordable. They
are not.

Id. at cil16
In so concluding, the Court held that preinjury releases that had been
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signed at the direction of the ski resort were contrary to public policy and
unenforceable. Id. at <jf20.
Here, the McMurdie Parties cite to no statute or case which would
address the public policy at issue or void Zane Jeppesen's contracts. Neither do
they articulate how the promissory notes sold by Zane Jeppesen harm the
public as a whole. It is likely fair to suggest that the public is generally
offended with reports of investment scams, such as the BHDC. However,
public outrage does not equate to public harm, and there is nothing here to
suggest that the particular investment scam at issue harmed the public as a
whole, as opposed to merely harming the contracting parties.
However, concluding that public policy does not void the contracts
executed between Zane Jeppesen and the McMurdies does not completely end
the inquiry. There is a distinction between contracts which are void ab initio
and contracts which are merely voidable:
A contract or a deed that is void cannot be ratified or accepted and
anyone can attack its validity in court. In contrast, a contract or deed
that is voidable may be ratified at the election of the injured party. Once
ratified, the voidable contract or deed is deemed valid. A deed that is
voidable is valid against the world, including the granter, because only
the injured party has standing to ask the court to set it aside.
In general, the difference between void and voidable contracts is
whether they offend public policy. Contracts that offend an individual,
such as those arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, are
voidable. Only contracts that offend public policy or harm the public
are void ab initio.

Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 'f[ci[18-19, 189 P.3d 51.
In the present case, Zane Jeppesen' s promissory note investments and
the Modification Agreement were part of a securities fraud scam. They are
contracts which arise from fraud and misrepresentation and are voidable, but
may be ratified at the election of the injured parties-here, the McMurdie Parties.
The McMurdie Parties have not elected to ratify the Modification Agreement,
which purportedly releases Zane Jeppesen from liability for his securities fraud
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violations. Thus, neither Zane Jeppesen nor Luke Jeppesen can rely upon the
Modification Agreement to discharge the McMurdie's claims.
Given that the McMurdie Parties have not discharged Zane Jeppesen's
liability as to his securities violations, evidence of those violations is relevant
and the Court will consider it. Summary judgment in favor of the McMurdie
Parties on this issue is properly granted.

III.

LUKE JEPPESEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
QUIET TITLE CLAIMS/BANK OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST LUKE JEPPESEN AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BANK OF UTAH

Luke Jeppesen asserts that title to the Alpine Property should be quieted
in his favor because the trustee's sale which conveyed the Alpine Property to
the McMurdie IRA was invalid. He brings the present motion based upon the
following arguments: (1) the trustee's sale was conducted after the applicable
statute of limitations had expired, and (2) the obligation which secured the 2001
Trust Deeds was discharged. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A.

Statute of Limitations

Luke Jeppesen contends that the trustee's sale which conveyed the
Alpine Property to the McMurdie IRA was defective because it occurred after
the applicable statute of limitations expired. The Court agrees.
A non-judicial foreclosure sale must be conducted within the time period
for enforcing the underlying debt. At the time litigation on this matter
commenced, Real Estate Code provided as follows:
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made ...
within the period prescribed by law for the commencement of an action
on the obligation secured by the trust deed.
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-34.3 An action to enforce the obligation under a written

3

Minor amendments to this section were made in 2016. No substantive change to the
applicable statute of limitations was made, and in any case, the Court applies the statute
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promissory note must be brought within six years: "An action may be brought
within six years ... upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing(.]" Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-309(2). A claim accrues on the
date: (1) the debt arose, (2) the debtor acknowledges the debt in writing, or (3)
the last payment is made by the debtor. Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-113. Thus, in
order to prevail on this point the McMurdie Parties must demonstrate that one
of these events occurred on or after July 23, 2009-six years before the July 23,
2015 trustee's sale. This they cannot do.
The 2015 trustee's sale was triggered by default on the 2001 Notes. The
trustee's Notice of Default so indicates, describing a "breach of the obligation
set forth in the Trust Deed Note dated September 24, 2001[.]" The McMurdie
Parties have acknowledged that the last payment made on the 2001 Notes was
received on March 18, 2004, over eleven years before the trustee's sale and well
outside of the statute of limitations. The McMurdie Parties have further failed
to dispute paragraph 29 of Luke Jeppesen's statement of material facts, which
avers that Zane Jeppesen did not sign a written acknowledgment of the 2001
Note or provide a promise to pay that debt. Any attempt to use the
Modification Agreement as a written acknowledgment of the 2001 Note fails
because that document has been voided. Moreover, even if it were an
enforceable agreement, its plain language directs that it was executed to modify
the 2004 Notes, not the 2001 Note. Thus, there is no dispute that the 2015
trustee's sale was conducted long after the applicable statute of limitations had
expired.
Recognizing this obstacle, the McMurdie Parties assert that the statute of
limitations was tolled under the equitable discovery rule. In summary, the
McMurdie Parties contend that the McMurdies did not discover Zane
Jeppesen' s fraud until after March of 2011, and the six year statute of limitations
did not begin to run until that time.
For the equitable discovery rule to apply, one of two situations must
exist: (1) 'a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of
the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct' or (2) 'the case
presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general
rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the

in effect at the time this action was filed.
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defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.'

Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, <j{23, 223 P.3d 1128 (emphasis added) (quoting
Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, <jl25).
Application of the first prong of the equitable discovery rule (the
"Concealment Rule") thus begins with the plaintiff's showing of concealment,
such that the plaintiff neither knew nor should have known of the cause of
action. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "a plaintiff must make a prima
fade showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered his or her
claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996). Here, the
McMurdie Parties offer a string of actions, primarily on the part of Zane
Jeppesen, which convinced the McMurdies that their investment was safe and
they would receive payment. Their delay in seeking foreclosure is thus
explained.
However, the fatal flaw in this argument is that, even assuming it is true,
the McMurdies were fully aware that Zane Jeppesen was in default. The
McMurdies may have been persuaded not to file a claim or seek foreclosure,
but they were aware that they could. There was no concealment of their cause
of action and the Concealment Rule does not apply.
Absent a showing of concealment, a moving party may proceed under
the second prong of equitable discovery-the "Exceptional Circumstances" rule.
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations
irrational or unjust turns on a balancing test. However, before a court
reaches this test, an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not

know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of
action in time to file a claim within the limitation period.
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added).
Thus, reliance upon the Exceptional Circumstances rule does not relieve the
McMurdie Parties from their obligation to make a threshold showing that they
did not know of their claim. The McMurdie Parties have failed to do so and the
Exceptional Circumstances rule does not apply.
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Because neither version of the equitable discovery rule applies to the
facts of this case, the statute of limitations invalidates the 2015 trustee's sale.

fi)\
\;;JI

Notwithstanding the failure under the statute of limitations, the
McMurdie Parties claim in their motion for summary judgment on this issue
that title to the Alpine Property should be quieted in favor of the McMurdie
IRA because Zane Jeppesen's quit claim deed conveyed to Luke Jeppesen only
the interest that he had. Zane Jeppesen's interest was encumbered by the 2001
Trust Deed. Thus, "from the moment Luke Jeppesen received his quitclaimed
interest in the Alpine Property, he faced the prospect of a nonjudicial
foreclosure on the trust deeds recorded in 2001." Bank of Utah's Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 17. This is correct, however, it ignores the legal
requirement that any such foreclosure proceeding must take place within the
limitations period.
Based upon the foregoing, summary judgment in favor of Luke Jeppesen
on the statute of limitations issue is properly granted.

B.

Discharge of the 2001 Trust Deeds

Luke Jeppesen next contends that the trustee's sale which conveyed the
Alpine Property to the McMurdie IRA was defective because the obligation
secured by the 2001 Trust Deeds had previously been discharged by the 2004
Notes. The Court disagrees, but nevertheless concludes that the enforceability
of the 2004 Notes does not defeat the statute of limitations issue discussed supra.
There is no dispute that the McMurdie's original investment was secured
by the 2001 Trust Deeds. Under Utah's Real Estate Code, a trustee holds title to
real property in trust and "is given the power of sale by which the trustee may
exercise and cause the trust property to be sold ... after a breach of an
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security[.]" Utah Code
Ann. §57-1-23. Thus, the trustee had the authority to foreclose on the Alpine
Property based upon a breach of the 2001 Note.
Luke Jeppesen maintains that 2001 Note was superceded by the 2004
Notes and that the 2004 Notes are a substituted contract. Utah courts have
adopted the Restatement position on substituted contracts, holding:
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The Second Restatement of Contracts defines a substituted contract as
follows:
"(1) A substituted contract is a contract that is itself accepted by the
obligee in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty.
(2) The substituted contract discharges the original duty and breach of
the substituted contract by the obligor does not give the obligee a right
to enforce the original duty."

Horman v. Gordan, 740 P.2d 1346, 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 279 (1982)).
For a substituted contract to be valid, it must be supported by
consideration. Id. at 1351. Here, Luke Jeppesen asserts that there was
consideration in the form of compound interest which increased Zane
Jeppesen's financial obligation to the McMurdies. Luke Jeppesen thus
concludes that Zane Jeppesen' s obligations under the 2001 Note were
discharged and the trustee had no authority to foreclose on the security for that
note.
The McMurdie Parties counter that the 2004 Notes (as well as the
Modification Agreement discussed supra) were illegal contracts and thus
unenforceable. As voided contracts, the 2004 Notes could not have superceded
the 2001 Note and Zane Jeppesen's obligation under the first note could be
enforced. The McMurdie Parties further assert that Zane Jeppesen' s obligations
under the 2001 Note survived bankruptcy, and that Zane Jeppesen surrendered
the Alpine Property for foreclosure by any creditor. The Court has concluded
supra that Zane Jeppesen's promissory note investments arose from a
fraudulent scheme and are thus voidable by the McMurdies. However, even in
finding the 2004 Notes to be unenforceable on that basis, the McMurdie Parties
are still unable to counter the statute of limitations impediment, discussed
supra.
Ultimately, the McMurdie Parties appear to seek an equitable remedy in
order to arrive at a result which will punish Zane Jeppesen for his bad acts and
provide some measure of restitution to the McMurdies. Interestingly, Zane
Jeppesen offers no counter to the McMurdie Parties' account of his fraudulent
conduct, which provides the McMurdies with a compelling emotional
argument. Notwithstanding, this Court cannot substitute equity for statutory
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requirements. "It is settled in Utah that the law will not imply an equitable
remedy when there is an adequate remedy at law. Moreover, when seeking an
equitable remedy, a plaintiff must affirmatively show a lack of an adequate
remedy at law on the face of the pleading." Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT
App 297, 128, 243 P.3d 500 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the McMurdie Parties were aware that Zane Jeppesen was in
breach of his financial obligations and the law offered the remedy of foreclosure
on the Alpine Property, provided that the McMurdie Parties executed on that
remedy within six years. They failed to do so and summary judgment in favor
of Luke Jeppesen on this issue is properly granted.
C.

Statutory Claim of Failure to Release Security Interest

In addition to asserting that summary judgment should be granted in
favor of the McMurdie Parties with respect to the quiet title claim, the
McMurdie IRA further contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Luke Jeppesen's statutory claim. Luke Jeppesen counters that the statutory
requirements have been satisfied and he is entitled to summary judgment in his
favor. The Court concurs with the McMurdie IRA.
Utah Law provides as follows:
A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on
a secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the
loan is liable to another secured lender on the real property or the
owner or titleholder of the real property for:
(a)
the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because
of the failure to release the security interest, including all expenses
incurred in completing a quiet title action; and
(b)
reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.

Utah Code Ann. §57-1-38(3).
The McMurdie IRA does not dispute that it is a secured lender within the
meaning of this provision, but rather focuses its opposition on the "after receipt
of the final payment of the loan" language. The McMurdie IRA takes the
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position that, because Zane Jeppesen never made a final payment on the 2001
Note, this statutory provision simply doesn't apply.
Luke Jeppesen contends that, because the 2001 Note was satisfied by the
2004 Notes, final payment was received. This, however, assumes that the 2004
Notes are enforceable contracts. As discussed supra, The 2004 Notes arose from
fraud and are voidable documents, enforceable only upon the election of the
McMurdies. As such, Luke Jeppesen cannot rely upon the 2004 Notes in order
to make his statutory claim.
Based upon the foregoing, there was no final payment of the 2001 Note
and the McMurdie IRA is thereby not liable for failure to release the secured
interest on that obligation. Summary judgment in favor of the McMurdie IRA
is properly granted.

IV.

LUKE JEPPESEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
CLAIMS FOR PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AND CIVIL
CONSPIRACY

A.

Pattern of Unlawful Activity

The McMurdie Parties have brought a pattern of unlawful activity claim
against Luke Jeppesen and Zane Jeppesen, alleging that, acting in concert, they
defrauded creditors, concealed assets, and committed the crimes of theft and
theft by extortion in an ongoing scheme to defraud the McMurdie Parties.
Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act ("UPUA") provides as follows:
1)

(2)

It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds
derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
unlawful activity in which the person has participated as a
principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise.
It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful
activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise.
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(3)

(4)

It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of unlawful activity.
It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision
of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).

Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1603.
Under UPUA, an "enterprise" is defined as "any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-1602(1). The McMurdie Parties assert, and Luke Jeppesen does not
dispute, that the Jeppesen family can be considered an enterprise within this
broad definition.
One engages in "unlawful activity" within the meaning of UPUA when
one "solicit[s], request[s], command[s], encourage[s], or intentionally aid[s]
another person to engage in conduct" which is enumerated in a list of predicate
offenses. Id. at (4). A "pattern of unlawful activity" consists of "at least three
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics." Id.
at (2).
Luke Jeppesen seeks summary judgment on this claim, asserting that the
McMurdie Parties have failed to plead a course of conduct that comes within
the meaning of UPUA. The Court agrees.

~

While UPUA is a complex piece of legislation, it can be distilled into two
simple elements: "To sustain a claim of racketeering under UPUA, two
elements must be met. The party alleging violation of UPUA must show that (1)
the defendant is engaged in a pattern of unlawful activity and (2) the defendant
is involved in an enterprise." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P .2d 295,
302 (Utah App. 1994). Here, the parties expend significant effort arguing about
the alleged predicate acts within the pattern of unlawful activity described by
the McMurdie Parties, with Luke Jeppesen asserting that many of the alleged
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acts do not meet the requisite elements. However, those arguments
need not be reached because there are no facts to support the second element of
involvement in an illicit enterprise. 4
Under UPUA, it is not enough to simply allege an enterprise and
compile a list of predicate acts. A plaintiff must demonstrate a particular
relationship between the predicate acts and the enterprise. "The language of
[UPUA] is clear that the defendant must 'use or invest' the proceeds from the
unlawful activity in the proscribed manner, namely the 'acquisition,'
'establishment,' or 'operation of' an 'enterprise."' State v. Bradshaw, 2004 UT
App 298, <]130, 99 P.3d 359. Rev'd on other grounds, State v. Bradshaw, 2006 UT 87,
152 P.3d 288 (emphasis added). The Bradshaw Court compared UPUA to the
related federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
and observed that "the RICO statute does not state that it is unlawful to receive
racketeering income; rather, as the ... language underscores, the statute
prohibits a person who has received such income from using or investing it in the
proscribed manner." Id. at <]131 (emphasis in original).

In the present case, the McMurdie Parties have failed to place facts in
dispute which would support a claim that Luke Jeppesen used or invested
racketeering income in the operation of an illicit enterprise. Assuming all facts
in the light most favorable to the McMurdie Parties, Luke Jeppesen was aware
of his father's investment securities scam and agreed to receive the Alpine
Property by quitclaim. However, he did not invest any proceeds of that
property into the enterprise. Instead, he retained the Alpine Property, agreeing
to seek bankruptcy protection in order to delay foreclosure. That having failed,
he has presently allowed family members to pay his legal fees in an attempt to
quiet title to the Alpine Property. The Jeppesen family may be construed as an
enterprise, and the Court can even infer that predicate acts may have occurred. 5
Nevertheless, this course of conduct fails under UPUA, at least with respect to

4

Luke Jeppesen's argument on this point was fully briefed, yet the McMurdie Parties failed
to refute it. The Court interprets this silence as a concession that Luke Jeppesen lacked the
necessary involvement with an illicit enterprise..

5

Given that summary judgment is proper on other grounds, the Court is declining to reach
the issue of whether the McMurdies have sufficiently plead predicate acts in support of their
UPUAclaim.

Page 18 of 22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2739

Luke Jeppesen, because there is no suggestion that Luke Jeppsen made any
investment into the enterprise. Receiving a quitclaim deed and taking
subsequent legal actions at the behest and the expense of his family does not
equate to investing enterprise proceeds back into an illicit enterprise, which is
what UPUA requires. Luke Jeppesen has invested nothing.

In summary, while the conduct the McMurdie Parties attribute to Luke
Jeppesen is far from favorable, it does not fit within UPUA. As described in

Bradshaw:
Like its RICO cousin, [UPUA] is a fairly intricate criminal statute, and ..
. garden-variety fraud and deceit ... is wholly insufficient to
demonstrate probable cause to support a bindover[.] See Dempsey v.
Sanders, 132 F.Supp.2d 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (" '[Because the RICO
statute] is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation equivalent of a
thermonuclear device ... courts must always be on the lookout for the
putative RICO case that is really nothing more than an ordinary fraud
case clothed in the Emperor's trendy garb.' ") (quoting Schmidt v. Fleet
Bank, 16 F.Supp.2d 340,346 (S.D.N.Y.1998)); State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d
191, 195 (Minn.1994) ( "Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug
'kingpins' or major crime syndicates, but neither do we think our Act is
intended to make a racketeer out of every criminal offender.").

Id. at 132.
Based upon the foregoing, summary judgement in favor of Luke
Jeppesen is properly granted on this issue.

B.

Civil Conspiracy

The Utah Supreme Court has outlined the five requisite elements of civil
conspiracy as follows: '"(l) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object
to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action,
(4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof."' Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P .2d 1282, 1290 fn 17 (Utah 1993)
(quoting Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785,790 (Utah Ct.App.1987)). In
asserting in their counterclaim that Luke and Zane Jeppesen conspired to
defraud the McMurdie IRA of the Alpine Property, the McMurdie Parties
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appear to claim that the "object to be accomplished" was the tort of fraud.
To plead a viable claim of fraud, a party must establish:
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3)
which was false; (4) which the representer either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon
which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage.

Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, Cj[53 fn 38, 201 P.3d 966. All
allegations of fraud must be plead with particularity. URCP 9(b).
Luke Jeppesen seeks summary judgment on the conspiracy to commit
fraud claim, asserting that the McMurdie Parties have failed to meet the
elements of fraud. 6 The Court agrees.
The underlying false statements the McMurdie Parties have attributed to
Luke Jeppesen are stated with particularity in their discovery responses. That
response provides as follows:
Luke Jeppesen told Shira McMurdie, who has cut his hair for years, that
he would not take any steps that would harm the McMurdies. He lied.
His bogus quiet title claim in this lawsuit is causing the McMurdies
considerable financial and emotional harm. Luke Jeppesen falsely
asserts that he has a legally enforceable right to the Alpine Property.
This discovery answer offers two alleged misrepresentations: (1) Luke
Jeppesen falsely claimed that he would not harm the McMurdies, and (2) Luke
Jeppesen falsely asserts a legal right to the Alpine Property. Neither of these
statements meet the elements of fraud.
As to both statements, even assuming that Luke Jeppesen was false in his
6

Luke Jeppesen's argument with respect to the civil conspiracy claim is fully briefed in his summary
judgment motion. The McMurdie Parties offered no rebuttal. The Court interprets this silence as a
concession.
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claim that he would never harm the McMurdies, and false in his claim that he
had a legal right to the Alpine Property, there is no evidence to suggest that the
McMurdies relied upon those statements to their detriment. Absent such
evidence, the facts before the Court fail to support a claim for fraud.

Moreover, as to the second statement, the act of filing a lawsuit cannot
form the basis for a claim of fraud. Statements made within pleadings, as well
as statements made during the course of judicial proceedings, enjoy an absolute
privilege:
The judicial proceeding privilege recognizes that statements of
attorneys, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in the
judicial process enjoy an absolute privilege against liability for torts if
the statements are made during or preliminary to a judicial proceeding.
Three elements must be satisfied for the privilege to apply: (1) "the
statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial
proceeding; (2) the statement must have some reference to the subject
matter of the proceeding; and (3) the statement must have been made
by someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant or
counsel."

Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners Ass'n, Inc., 201 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1138 (D.
Utah 2002) (quoting Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997)).
Here, all the elements of the judicial proceeding privilege are met. Luke
Jeppesen' s statement that he holds a legally enforceable right in the Alpine
Property is asserted in his Complaint. The statement is directly related to the
subject matter of this dispute, and the statement was made u:i Luke Jeppesen' s
capacity as a litigant. Thus, Luke Jeppesen' s claims in the present case cannot
form the basis of fraud.
Based upon the foregoing, summary judgment on this issue is properly
granted.
V.

CONCLUSION

The competing motions for summary judgment presently before the
Court are granted in part and denied in part as follows:
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With respect to the McMurdie Parties' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Securities Issues, summary judgment in favor of the McMurdie
Parties is granted with respect to the following issues: (1) Zane Jeppesen
committed securities fraud; (2) Zane Jeppesen was not licensed to sell securities;
(3) the securities sold by Zane Jeppesen ·were not registered; and (4) the
$500,000.00 Zane Jeppesen received from the McMurdie Parties constitutes a
security. The McMurdie Parties assert that an additional $60,000.00 was
included and the combined $560,000.00 should be viewed a s a single security;
however, a dispute of fact regarding the $60,000.00 remains and that issue is
reserved for trial.
As to the quiet title claim, summary judgment in favor of Luke Jeppesen
is granted with respect to the statute of limitations issue. Summary judgment is
otherwise denied.

~

Ct.

As to the statutory failure to release security interest claim, summary
judgment in favor of the McMurdie IRA is granted.

As to the UPUA and civil conspiracy claims, summary judgment in favor
of Luke Jeppesen is granted.
SO ORDERED.

This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no
further order is required.
DATED this_/_&_ day of August, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

~

certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
REVISE OR VACATE
RULING GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LUKE D. JEPPESEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
~

BANK OF UTAH CUSTODIAN
FOR HARRY MCMURDIE IRA,

Civil No.150401095
Date: November 21, 2016

Defendant.
Judge Christine S. Johnson
This matter is before the Court on Defendants/Counterclaim & ThirdParty Plaintiffs' Motion to Revise or Vacate Ruling Granting Summary
Judgment on Quiet Title Claim, filed on August 29, 2016.
Plaintiff/Counterclaim & Third Party Defendant's opposition was received by
the Court on September 8, 2016. Defendants/Counterclaim & Third-Party
Plaintiffs filed their reply on September 12, 2016. Oral arguments were
conducted on November 15, 2016. Plaintiff/Counterclaim & Third-Party
Defendant was present through counsel, Mr. Bryan H. Booth.
Defendant/Counterclaim & Third-Party Plaintiff was present through counsel,
Mr. Marty E. Moore. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and
considered the argument presented, and being familiar with the applicable law
and governing rules, the Court now denies the pending motion, based upon the
following:
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BACKGROUND
A complete discussion of the facts is detailed in the Court's Ruling and
Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment dated August 16, 2016 (the
"Summary Judgment Ruling"), and need not be restated here. In summary, the
present controversy arises from a failed investment. Defendant, the McMurdie
IRA, and later Third-Party Plaintiffs Harry McMurdie and Shira McMurdie
(collectively the "McMurdie Parties") made certain investments with Zane
Jeppesen, beginning with a promissory note dated September 24, 2001 (the
"2001 Note"). In the 2001 Note, Zane Jeppessen agreed to repay a $500,000 loan
with interest at twelve percent to the McMurdie IRA on or before March 24,
2003. The 2001 Note was secured by two Deeds of Trust (the "2001 Trust
Deeds") recorded against certain real property (the "Alpine Property"). The
beneficiary of the 2001 Trust Deeds was the McMurdie IRA. Ultimately, Zane
Jeppesen failed to make full payment on this obligation, with the final payment
being received on March 18, 2001.
On March 24, 2003, and again on March 24, 2004, Zane Jeppesen
executed additional promissory notes regarding the same $500,000 loan (the
"2003 Note" and the "2004 Notes"). However, the payee on these notes was
Harry and/or Shira McMurdie and the Harry and Shira McMurdie Family
Trust-not the McMurdie IRA. The interest rates were also modified, with the
interest rate on the 2003 Note being eight percent compounded. The interest
rate on the 2004 Notes was further modified, with Jeppesen agreeing to pay
eight percent interest on the principal ($500,000), but sixteen percent
compounded on the interest which had accrued on the principal ($200,271.11).
The 2004 Notes further referred to a deed of trust which was to be executed on
the same date in order to secure the payee against default. No such trust deed
was executed. A final agreement regarding Zane Jeppesen's debt to the
McMurdie Parties was executed on March 22, 2011. This document, titled the
"Loan Modification, Extension and Change in Terms Agreement" (the
"Modification Agreement") stated that "the 2001 Note was replaced and
superseded by [the 2004 Notes] designating the McMurdies as lenders and
holders of the 2004 Notes."

On January 7, 2010, Zane Jeppesen executed and recorded a quit-claim
deed conveying his interest in the Alpine Property to the Plaintiff, his son Luke
Jeppesen. Subsequently, on December 3, 2014, the successor trustee under the
Page2of 6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3037

ls

Ci

~

McMurdie IRA recorded a Notice of Default seeking to foreclose on the Alpine
Property. The Notice of Default describes that the trustee's sale was sought
based upon the breach of the 2001 Note. The sale went forward and a Trustee's
Deed conveying the Alpine Property to the McMurdie IRA was recorded on
July 28, 2015.
Believing that the trustee's sale was conducted in violation of law, Luke
Jeppesen filed the present complaint against the McMurdie IRA seeking to quiet
title to the Alpine Property. The McMurdie Parties filed a counterclaim,
bringing their own quiet title claim, inter alia. Cross motions for summary
judgment were filed and the Court ruled in favor of Luke Jeppesen, concluding
that the trustee's sale was conducted after the applicable statute of limitations
had expired. The McMurdie Parties now ask the Court to vacate that ruling.

~

tj

ANALYSIS
The McMurdie Parties seek to vacate a portion of the Court's Summary
Judgment Ruling pursuant to Rule 54(b), which applies to non-final judgments,
and 59(a), which applies to post-final judgments. The parties have not
discussed which rule is better-suited. However, because no final judgment has
been entered, the Court will consider the present motion under Rule 54(b). This
provision allows that a judgment which does not adjudicate all of the claims of
the parties "may be changed at any time before the entry of judgment[.]"
"Whether to reconsider a prior ruling is ordinarily within the sound discretion
of the district court[.]" Colony Ins. Co. V. Human Ensemble, LLC, 2013 UT App 68,
<j[6, 299 P.3d 1149. However, the trial court is required to reassess a prior ruling
"(1) when there has been an intervening change of authority; (2) when new
evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Mid-Am.
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ,r 14, 216 P.3d 352 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

In the present case, neither of the first two circumstances apply. There
has been no change in authority since this issue was last before the Court, and
no new evidence has been introduced. Indeed, each of the exhibits produced
were previously examined by the Court when the cross motions for summary
judgment were initially argued. The McMurdie Parties instead appear to rely
upon the third prong, asserting that the Court's prior decision was erroneous in
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(1) relying upon the wrong statute of limitation, and (2) accepting the
McMurdie Parties' election to void all agreements which followed the 2001
Notes. The Court will consider each argument in tum.
The McMurdie Parties claim that the Court erroneously relied upon
Section 78B-2-113 instead of Section 78B-2-309. The Court disagrees. The
Summary Judgment Ruling clearly cites to Section 78B-2-309 on page 11, noting
that "[a]n action may be brought within six years ... upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing[.]" Utah Code
Ann. §78B-2-309(2). The Court thereafter applied the six year limitations
period, holding that, in order to validate the trustee's sale of the Alpine
Property, a triggering event must have occurred six years before the date the
trustee's sale was conducted. The Court concluded that default on the 2001
Note was the triggering event, and that this default occurred over eleven years
before the trustee's sale. Summary Judgment Ruling, at p. 11. The trustee's sale
was thus conducted outside of the limitations period.
Having applied the precise limitations period now advocated by the
McMurdie Parties, the McMurdie Parties' statute of limitations argument fails
to provide a basis to revise the Summary Judgment Ruling.
The McMurdie Parties' election to void all agreements which followed
the 2001 Note forms the true basis for requesting revision of the Summary
Judgment Ruling. When the cross motions for summary judgment were first
argued, the McMurdie Parties asserted that these subsequent agreements,
including the 2003 Note, the 2004 Notes, and the Modification Agreement, were
part of an investment scam, and that they were illegal and unenforceable. The
Court agreed and set them aside, leaving intact only the 2001 Note.
Recognizing that this position created a statute of limitations issue, the
McMurdie Parties then claimed that the limitations period ought to be tolled
under the equitable discovery rule. The Court rejected that argument because
equitable tolling requires that the cause of action is concealed from the plaintiff,
and the McMurdie Parties were clearly aware that Zane Jeppesen was in default
on the 2001 Note. See Summary Judgment Ruling, at p. 11-13.
Having failed with their previous arguments, the McMurdie Parties now
reverse their prior position and request that the Court enforce the 2003 Note,
the 2004 Note, and the Modification Agreement. The McMurdie Parties assert
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that these subsequent agreements were intended to renew and extend the 2001
Note, thus avoiding the statute of limitations issue.

~

The McMurdie Parties correctly observe that a new note may serve to
renew a debt rather than extinguish it. See First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Proudfit
Sporting Goods Co., 552 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976). However, a subsequent agreement
may also serve to merge previous obligations, resulting in a discharge of prior
debts. Whether a new agreement should extend an old agreement or discharge
it is governed by "the general rule that the intent of the parties should control
the 'renewal' effect of subsequent promissory notes." Peterson v. U.S., 511
F.Supp. 250, 255 (D. Utah 1981). "[O]ne contract will not supersede another
'unless it is plainly shown that [such] was the intent of the parties; and this is
usually where the later contract fully covers [the] earlier one."' Ward v. lHC
Health Services, Inc., 2007 UT App 362, 18, 173 P.3d 186 (quoting Hannan v.
Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
In the present case, we need not puzzle about the intentions of the
parties. The Modification Agreement unambiguously states that "the 2001 Note
was replaced and superseded by [the 2004 Notes] designating the McMurdies
as lenders and holders of the 2004 Notes." Moreover, the 2004 Notes substitute
different parties (Harry and Shira McMurdie and the McMurdie Family Trust in
lieu of the McMurdie IRA) as well as different amounts (the $200,271.11 interest
which had accrued on the 2001 Note) and different interest rates (sixteen
percent compounded in lieu of twelve percent). Thus, the plain language of the
documents does not support the McMurdie Parties position that the 2004 Notes
are merely extensions of the 2001 Note. Rather, they appear to be new
obligations which supercede and satisfy the 2001 Note. The McMurdie Parties
dodged these issues when the cross motions for summary judgment were
argued by asking that the Court simply void the 2004 Notes and the
Modification Agreement. Ultimately, reversing that course in order to defeat
the statute of limitations bar lands the McMurdie Parties squarely on the horns
of a different dilemma.

I

I
I
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Based upon the foregoing, there is no basis upon which to revisit the
Summary Judgment Ruling under Rule 54. The Court's prior ruling was not
clearly erroneous and the McMurdie Parties' motion to revise is properly

DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no
further order is required.

DATEDthis

;)]

day of November, 2016.

BY THE COURT:

Christine S
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